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INTRODUCTION
The federal criminal trial rate in the United States was 14% in 1990 and
5% in the year 2000.1 In 2019, it was 2.4%2 nationally and 0.7% in the
District of Arizona, where this Author practices.3 These numbers mean
assistant federal public defenders (AFPDs) are not in trial yearly. I know
recently retired AFPDs who tried only one or two cases during their last
decade of work.4 AFPDs in the 1970s and early 1980s tried approximately
one case per month.5 Before becoming an AFPD, I was fortunate to have
averaged three trials per year from 2005 to 2015 as an assistant Pima
County Public Defender. The trial rate back then, in that jurisdiction, was
higher.6
The dearth of trials is problematic for defendants.7 In a system with
high-frequency plea bargaining, many realize they have little to no chance
of fighting their case.8 For the falsely accused, trials are a vehicle for
1. See William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061,
1066 (2019) (citing Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial
Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55
SMU L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2002)).
2. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2019,
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 4 tbl.2 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2019/az19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WJG-E63U].
3. See id. at 6.
4. Grant Bashore tried one case in his last decade of work as supervisory AFPD. See
Email from Grant Bashore, former supervisory AFPD, Dist. of Arizona, to author (Oct. 30,
2021, 7:58 AM) (on file with author). Deirdre Mokos only went to trial twice in 20 years of
practice as AFPD. See Email from Deidre Mokos, former AFPD, Dist. of Arizona, to author
(Nov. 1, 2021, 8:35 AM) (on file with author). Vicki Brambl, an active supervisory AFPD,
has tried 19 cases in 27 years. See Email from Vicki Brambl, Level II Supervisory AFPD,
Dist. of Arizona, to author (Oct. 29, 2021, 9:57 AM) (on file with author). She is an outlier
and had a smaller caseload after becoming a supervisor in 2004. See id.
5. See Interview with Fredric Kay, Former Fed. Pub. Def. for the Dist. of Arizona
(1984 to 2004) (Sept. 22, 2021) (on file with author).
6. See Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, The Vanishing Jury Trial Phenomenon
& Trial Preparation, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 2010, at 22, 28 (2010) (stating Robert J. Hirsh,
former Pima County Public Defender, reported a trial rate of 8.5% to 9% in 2005 in Pima
County, dropping to 7.5% in 2010).
7. Federal District Judge William G. Young wrote that jury trials are important because
“the jury achieves symbolically what cannot be achieved practically — the presence of the
entire populace at every trial.” William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries,
Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 69 (2006) (quoting PAULA DIPERNA,
JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 21 (1984)). He proclaimed: “Through the
jury, we place the decisions of justice where they rightly belong in a democratic society: in
the hands of the governed.” Id. at 69–70. Juries provide a democratic “counterbalance” to a
largely unelected judiciary. See id. at 70 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 236 (2005)).
8. I base this on six and a half years’ experience representing federal criminal
defendants.
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vindication.9 But with almost no trials, they have difficulty finding live
proceedings to observe — fewer opportunities for understanding its
mechanics.10 In custody, defendants have a tough time talking to each
other about trials because they rarely reject plea agreements.11 Because
lawyers seldom try cases, they cannot give much information to clients
about its dynamics. Although most jurors convict, trials provide more
meaningful finality to defendants compared to trials where they plead
guilty because the defense lawyer confronted incriminating evidence
through cross examination and the jury made a final decision based on the
evidence.12
For lawyers, trials hone litigations skills such as thinking on one’s feet,
assessing and giving opinions about plea offers, articulating an opinion
strongly and persuasively, and maintaining a professional demeanor when
disagreeing with opposing counsel or the judge.13 Trying cases also gives
young lawyers the confidence to walk away from an undesirable plea offer,
skills to carefully read disclosure, produce successful ideas for motions,
and realize, ahead of trial, which witnesses to call.14 Trials are usually the
last resort if one loses a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss charges,
but low trial rates also mean lawyers are rarely in evidentiary hearings,
where they hone cross-examination skills.15 Trials are a break from the

9. The wrongful conviction rate for violent crimes is “around” 0.016%–0.062%. See
Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the
Conventional Wisdom About the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 815,
851 (2018). Figures for non-violent crimes are unknown but an estimate is that they account
for 18% of all exonerations. See Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and
What We Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 757
(2017).
10. This observation comes from interviews I have conducted of criminal defendants in
pre-trial federal custody, at the Central Arizona Federal Detention Center, operated by
CoreCivic.
11. See supra text accompanying note 10.
12. Most of my convicted clients thank me for my work during trial. During trial, they
saw my confrontation of witnesses and argument about the strength of evidence, which they
have expressed gratitude for when the process ended.
13. See Emily Lonergan, The Value of Trial Experience to a Young Lawyer, MARQ.
UNIV. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (June 18, 2013), https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2013/06/
the-value-of-trial-experience-to-a-young-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/WC3H-XLVY]. This
blog post addresses civil trials, but I find its points apply equally to criminal trials. See
generally id.
14. See id.
15. Although the trial rate is low on a national level, AFPDs litigate motions to suppress
more often than they are in trial. From my experience, AFPDs still file pre-trial motions to
suppress and to dismiss at low rates — at most two to three times a year.
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norm and supply something different from the routine of negotiating pleas,
preparing for sentencing, meeting with clients, and researching the law.16
Federal public defender offices (FPDOs) with lawyers who try cases
have better reputations and thus can attract higher-quality applicants.17 A
culture of complacency can overtake offices when lawyers go years
without seeing a jury: mentors disappear, confidence fades away, and
lawyers forget the Federal Rules of Evidence.18 FPDOs with minuscule
trial rates more easily fail to zealously represent the majority of clients
because they foster a culture of pushing pleas.19
But how did the federal criminal justice system get to this point? And
what are the implications for public defender practice? This Article
examines three factors that helped create the plea bargaining machine: the
United States Sentencing Guidelines,20 mandatory minimum sentencing
laws for drug cases, and fast-track programs. It explains the machine’s
real-life impact through AFPD work in the Tucson sector of the District of
Arizona. Because people of color disproportionately make up the
criminally accused, this Article argues that the exploitation of African
Americans, Latinxs, and American Indians21 helped facilitate plea
bargaining hegemony. Because trials are rare, AFPDs spend most of their

16. This observation comes from the Author’s professional experience as public
defender for over 16 years. Trials usually last several days, sometimes more. Spending an
entire week devoted to a trial is a welcome deviation from visiting multiple clients per week
in custody, preparing for sentencing hearings, negotiating, and even writing pre-trial
motions.
17. Three questions Harvard Law School encourage applicants to consider when
applying to public defender offices include: (1) “Are the lawyers highly regarded by the
criminal defense bar in the areas?”, (2) “Does the program have a reputation for zealous
advocacy?”, and (3) “What is the ratio of trials to pleas?” See LISA D. WILLIAMS, HARVARD
L. SCH., CAREERS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE 9 (2012), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/
uploads/2008/07/2012pdguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z53V-LNB9]. Undoubtedly having
trials is desirable from a hiring standpoint. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, CLASS OF
2019 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, https://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2019National
SummaryReport_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWB2-5L3S] (last visited Feb. 24, 2022).
18. See Email from Grant Bashore, supra note 4.
19. See Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1445, 1497 (2016) (“Many other public defender offices have an unfortunate culture
of pushing guilty pleas, probably due to high workloads.”).
20. Also known as “federal sentencing guidelines,” “sentencing guidelines,”
“guidelines,” or “U.S.S.G.”
21. The term “American Indian,” the more inclusive term, is used in this Article instead
of “Indigenous People.” See Native American and Indigenous Peoples FAQs, UCLA
EQUITY, DIVERSITY & INCLUSION, https://equity.ucla.edu/know/resources-on-nativeamerican-and-indigenous-affairs/native-american-and-indigenous-peoples-faqs/#term
[https://perma.cc/CN5N-57LL] (last visited Jan. 18, 2022). Federal Indian Law and the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget, through the U.S. Census Bureau use “American Indian.”
See About the Topic of Race, U.S. Census Bureau (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.census.
gov/topics/population/race/about.html [https://perma.cc/3AUL-V592].
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time advising clients to waive trial rights and on sentencing advocacy.22
This has implications for FPDO morale, training, and recruiting. Although
high plea rates may never go away, the Article supplies advice for FPDOs
and AFPDs to maximize the number of cases that should go to trial and
improve indigent representation.
The Article continues as follows: Part I reviews literature on the reasons
for low trial rates, current federal public defense practice, and what
happens when public defender offices force lawyers to go to trial. Part II
surveys the history of mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines, and
fast-track programs and explains how each suppresses the trial rate in the
District of Arizona through drug cases. Part III explains how the historical
exploitation of African Americans, Latinxs, and American Indians relates
to the racial disparity the plea bargaining machine created. Part IV delves
into a brief history of FPDOs, contrasts federal to state practice, and
explains how representation before the plea bargaining machine differs
from practice today. Part V examines efforts to abolish mandatory
minimums and how FPDOs can improve training and practice to get the
most from the plea bargaining machine.
I. LAY OF THE LAND
There is vast literature on low trial rates.23 Scholars have found various
causes responsible for the vanishing trial: mandatory minimums,
sentencing guidelines, Department of Justice (DOJ) charging policy, the
expense and complexity of trials, and improvements in technology. 24 But
their work has failed to address how these factors negatively affect federal
criminal defendants of color. While praising trials as desirable, scholars
also pass over how training can lower plea rates and enhance client

22. This observation is based on the Author’s experience as an AFPD for over six years
and a supervisory AFPD for just under one year.
23. This Part does not address every scholarly work on low federal trial rates. Instead, it
focuses on several law review articles closest to the topic of federal criminal defense
practice and race as they relate to low trial rates.
24. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 93 (2009) (explaining
that external factors such as attorney hourly rates and related expenses have decreased the
trial rate); see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 148–50 (1996) (finding that
federal sentencing guidelines led more offenders to plead guilty); Robert J. Conrad, Jr. &
Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to Sentencing
Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 144, 149 (2018) (explaining DOJ charging policy and
improved technology have increased plea bargaining and decreased the trial rate); Shari
Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the Disappearing Jury Trial:
Perspectives from Attorneys and Judges, 81 LA. L. REV. 119, 121 (2020) (finding defense
attorneys and judges see mandatory minimums as major source for decrease in trial rate).
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representation.25 Although attorneys David Patton and Joseph Hall have
described the plea bargaining machine’s impact on federal indigent defense
practice, they have failed to address the specific effects on drug and illegal
entry prosecutions. 26
A. Explanations for the Decline of Jury Trials
Professors Sheri Seidman Diamond and Jessica Salerno published the
results of a national survey on civil and criminal jury trials.27 The study
found that lawyers perceived mandatory minimums, the bail system, and
sentencing guidelines as the source of reduced criminal jury trials.28 The
vast majority of defense attorneys viewed mandatory minimums as having
a medium or large effect on trial rate reduction.29 Diamond and Salerno
explain that an important reason for increasing plea rates after sentencing
guideline implementation is downward departures for defendants who
accept responsibility for the offense after pleading guilty.30 Many
characterize sentences without reductions for acceptance of responsibility
after trial as the “trial penalty.”31 The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (NACDL) published a report after two years of
investigation into the trial penalty’s causes and viable solutions.32 It
reached similar conclusions as Seidman Diamond’s and Salerno’s survey.
The report found the causes for the decline in trial rates to include:

25. Clara Garcia and Carole J. Powell stress the importance of training on plea
bargaining but do not discuss the specifics of trial practice. See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez
& Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 YALE
L.J. 2358 (2013).
26. See Joseph S. Hall, Note, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing
Guidelines on Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1331 (1999);
see also David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J.
2578 (2013).
27. See Seidman Diamond & Salerno, supra note 24, at 119.
28. In 2016, over one-fifth of all federal offenders were convicted of an offense carrying
a mandatory minimum penalty. See id. at 126 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW
OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29 (2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/N86A-BQHR]).
29. See id. at 147.
30. See id. at 126.
31. See id. (citing An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force
Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutorsforce-drug-defendants-plead [https://perma.cc/PZ27-S8D5]).
32. See Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right
to Jury Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 331
(2019).
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(1) Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions that have reduced the
trial rate from over 20% 30 years ago to 3% today.33 Instead of mandatory
minimums leading to harsher punishments on a select group of the most
culpable defendants, the DOJ uses them to strong-arm guilty pleas and
punish those who exercise their right to a jury trial.34
(2) The sentencing guidelines, which supply excessively harsh
sentencing ranges for plea bargaining when mandatory sentences do not.35
(3) Federal judges, who are complicit in assuring low trial rates.36 They
believe defendants who go to trial “roll the dice” and either “win big or
lose big.”37 Judges accept plea bargains that compromise a severe
guidelines range but rarely vary downward far from the sentencing range
after trial.38
Lastly, Professor Ronald F. Wright, a highly cited criminal law scholar,
wrote that guilty plea rates increased after the sentencing guidelines took
effect.39
B. Plea Bargaining Machine’s Impact on Federal Public Defenders and
Their Clients
i. Today’s Practice Versus Practice During Gideon v. Wainright
David Patton, Executive Director for the Federal Defenders of New
York, compares today’s federal criminal justice system to the one during
the time of Gideon v. Wainright.40 He argues that the contemporary
accused are poorer, “disproportionately more [B]lack and Hispanic,” and
subject to a system with fewer trials but more frequent and lengthier pretrial detention.41 Today’s system is “inquisitorial” because a single
government investigates, finds facts, and makes crucial decisions.42 The
existing sentencing framework, with lengthy mandatory minimums, shifts

33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129–30 (2005).
40. See Patton, supra note 26, at 2583–86.
41. Id. at 2587 (“[I]n the fifty years since Gideon was decided and the Allen Report was
published, defendants in federal court have become poorer, disproportionately more [B]lack
and Hispanic, and subject to a system that affords them fewer trials and imposes more
frequent, lengthier pretrial detention.”).
42. See id. at 2590.
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discretion away from judges and juries to prosecutors.43 These mandatory
minimums do not provide a reasonable way to constrain discretion and
unwarranted disparities. Instead of leading to more uniform or tougher
sentences, they result in less transparency and fewer challenges to
government conduct.44
Criminal defendants in federal court during Gideon benefited from great
trial lawyers. Today, however, an accused person needs a lawyer who
negotiates, counsels, and investigates to prepare for sentencing.45 Most
defense work includes gathering mitigation evidence, asking prosecutors
for less prison time and reduced charges, and counseling clients about plea
bargains.46 Although 97.3% of federal defendants plead guilty, Patton
contends that the few number of trials are important and require courtroom
skills.47 Patton proposes the repeal of mandatory minimum sentences, less
reliance on sentencing guidelines, less draconian sentences, more pre-trial
release, and fuller and more timely disclosure.48
ii. Trial Rate’s Decline and Public Defender Offices
Unhappy with low trial rates in their office, Clara Garcia Hernandez,
Chief Public Defender for the County of El Paso, and Carole J. Powell,
Deputy Chief in the same office, took radical measures.49 They developed
a quota system where every lawyer had to go to trial twice a year.50 They
also created a chart with every lawyer’s name, displayed on a wall, that
tallied all trials.51 They sent office-wide emails congratulating lawyers on
trials, acquittals, and other favorable verdicts and gave lawyers
compensatory time or administrative leave when a trial ended.52
Supervisory file reviews included trial and plea considerations.53
These tactics led to complaints among staff and no meaningful results.54
The chart misled clients and family members that high trial rates mean
better lawyers.55 It devalued pre-trial work such as obtaining release,

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 2598.
See id.
See id. at 2599.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 2601.
See generally Garcia Hernandez & Powell, supra note 25.
See id. at 2368.
See id. at 2367.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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investigating defense theories and evidence, negotiating favorable
outcomes, and preparation that led to favorable results before trial.56 It
overlooked lawyers who are skilled negotiators.57 Garcia Hernandez and
Powell realized that trial rates are mostly controlled by factors outside the
lawyer’s power.58
Ultimately, they developed a survey to discover what services,
communication, and outcomes clients want and value from the system.59
Out of 558 clients, 8% wanted a trial, 39% a negotiated plea, and 51% were
unsure.60 Garcia Hernandez and Powell concluded that no public defender
office should operate a “plea mill” where line public defenders quickly and
without preparation advise and press clients to waive the constitutional
right to trial.61 Competent pre-trial and plea practice need investigation,
research, and preparation.62 Careful trial planning can lead to favorable
plea bargains.63
Competent plea bargaining requires “imagination,
resourcefulness, and acute negotiation skills” — valued in civil practice but
overlooked in criminal defense.64 Public defenders must conduct more
training and education in these areas.65
The following are Garcia Hernandez’s and Powell’s main points:
(1) Public defender offices should not punish line attorneys for not going
to trial.66
(2) Office goals should be to ensure that clients decide with lawyers’
effective advice and assistance.67
(3) A lawyer’s goals should not be driven by the expectations of a
supervisor, court, or prosecutor.68 Instead, goals should be defined by
standards to keep the office from becoming a plea-mill.69

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 2370.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 2366.
62. See id.
63. Defense attorney’s case preparation can result in more lenient pleas because such
preparation may convince the prosecution that the case is weak or has become weak. See
Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 450–51 (1971) (“When a New York or Philadelphia assistant prosecutor has a case
which he believes is weak, he will frequently offer large concessions to induce a guilty
plea.”).
64. See Garcia Hernandez & Powell, supra note 25, at 2366.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2370.
67. See id. at 2365–66.
68. See id. at 2370.
69. See id.
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(4) The amount and quality of work performed by lawyers on cases does
not correlate with the number of trials.70
(5) Public defender offices should look for ways to increase trial
numbers without sacrificing more favorable outcomes such as dismissals.71
While the El Paso County Public Defender’s Office trial rate remained
low after Garcia Hernandez’s and Powell’s experiment, close to half of the
trials resulted in acquittals.72 Eighty-two percent of all adult cases resolved
favorably relative to the prosecutor’s initial plea-bargain offer.73 In fiscal
years 2011 and 2012, the Office obtained dismissals on almost a quarter of
felonies, more than a third of misdemeanors, and a third of juvenile cases.74
The El Paso office has become more client-centered in process and clientdriven in outcomes.75
iii. Low Trial Rate’s Impact on Assistant Federal Public Defenders
Attorney Joseph Hall authored an article on the impact of the sentencing
guidelines on AFPDs and their clients.76 Although overworked for years
before the creation and application of the guidelines, AFPDs became busier
after their implementation because sentencing practice became more time
consuming and complicated.77 AFPD clients also got worse sentencing
outcomes.78 Prosecutors exploited this reality by threatening harsher
penalties if defendants did not accept a plea offer.79 The sentencing
guidelines also increased the difference between trial and plea outcomes.
This contributed to innocent clients pleading guilty at higher rates.80
Hall argues that because the guidelines made sentencing practice more
laborious, AFPDs are now more prone to curtailing sentencing litigation.81
Before the guidelines, AFPDs entered into agreements in cases in exchange
for agreements in other cases to preserve a working relationship with the
prosecution.82 This extends to practice after guideline implementation; at

70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 2369.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 2368.
75. See id. at 2370.
76. See Hall, supra note 26.
77. See id. at 1334.
78. See id. at 1370.
79. See id. at 1334.
80. See id. at 1347 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 39 n.129 (1997)).
81. See id. at 1344.
82. See id. at 1345.
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sentencing, new extended work makes AFPDs reluctant to raise all possible
issues “for fear of upsetting the prosecutor and the judge.”83
C. New Ways to Understand the Decline in Federal Trials
i. The Booker Decision, Charging Policy, and
Trial Complexity and Expense
Judge Robert J. Conrad and Attorney Katy Clements authored an article
on the decline of criminal jury trials, focusing on the ten-year span from
2006 to 2016.84 During this period, the number of criminal defendants who
went to trial nationwide decreased by 47%.85 Conrad’s and Clements’s
thesis is that mandatory minimum penalties, the sentencing guidelines, and
cooperation are the old trial-reducing factors that scholars have attributed
as responsible for causing the trial decline but are no longer applicable.86
Instead, the United States v. Booker87 decision, DOJ charging policy, and
external factors such as the expense of trials and stronger evidence
decreased trial rates and increased plea bargaining.88
1. The Booker Decision
These reasons explain how the Booker decision decreased the trial rate89:
(1) Courts now view the guidelines range as the highest number of
months to impose at sentencing.90 Only 2.4% of the 66,961 cases in the
United States Sentencing Commission’s sentencing data for fiscal year
2016 received above-guidelines-range sentences.91 Approximately 48.6%
of cases that year received within-guidelines-range sentences and 49.0%
received below-guidelines-range sentences.92
Downward variances

83. Id. (first citing Robinson O. Everett, Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of
Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–3 (1995); then citing MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING 131–38 (1978)).
84. See Conrad & Clements, supra note 24.
85. See id. at 105 (“From 2006 to 2016, the overall number of criminal jury trials
declined by 47%, and the jury trial rate declined by almost 40%.”).
86. See id. at 127.
87. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (finding the sentencing guidelines are advisory).
88. See Conrad & Clements, supra note 24, at 115.
89. See id. at 133–36.
90. See id. at 133.
91. See id. at 133 n.185 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.N (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/TableN.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB4ETM2V]).
92. See id.
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increased from 28.4% of cases before Booker to 49.0% of cases in 2016.93
Because plea offers post-Booker more easily reduce the applicable
sentencing range compared to trial, defense lawyers view plea bargaining
as lower risk for clients.94
(2) Booker elevated the importance of sentencing hearings.95 It now
makes sense to avoid jury trials because they provide a greater opportunity
to present incriminating evidence, which has only gotten stronger over the
twentieth century.96 If the prosecution must present a broad range of
incriminating facts to a jury, they would have an easier time presenting it to
a judge at sentencing if the case went to trial. Defense lawyers choose the
narrower scope at sentencings after plea agreements.97
2. DOJ Charging Policy
DOJ charging policy under former United States Attorney Generals John
Ashcroft and Eric Holder has not stopped the decrease in trials.98 Despite
ideological differences, both have helped lower the trial rate.99 Notably,
Eric Holder emphasized charging more immigration crimes compared to
drug crimes.100 Holder also encouraged fast-track charging to resolve cases
quickly.101 Thus, the Honorable Robert J. Conrad and Katy Clements
indicate this helped increase the plea rate by a couple of percentage points
more compared to Ashcroft.102

93. See id. at 133.
94. See id. at 133–34.
95. See id. at 134.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 146 (“[T]the number of jury trials continues to decline.”).
99. See generally id. at 144–49.
100. See id. at 142 (citing Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary: Table D-2, ADMIN.
OFF. U.S. CTS. (Dec. 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/d-2 [https://per
ma.cc/QE5V-NVXE] (“Holder invested more prosecutorial resources in filing immigration
charges as illegal immigration became a growing national problem.”)).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 147 (first citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureC.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV6E
-8DSV]; then citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.C (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-public
ations/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/FigureC.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG3D-CH9W];
and then citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
fig.C (2005), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2005/fig-C-post_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ63-8VMT]) (“In 2014
and 2015, after Holder’s memoranda, plea agreements resolved almost 97% of convicted
defendants’ cases compared to the 94.5% under Ashcroft in 2005.”).
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3. External Factors
Several external factors have made trials less appealing and helped
decrease the trial rate in the last two decades. First, technology has
improved the ability of cell phones and other devices to store more
incriminating evidence, which the government can access and present at
trial.103 Technology has also improved the ability to present evidence in a
more compelling way in the courtroom: larger screens today can display
computer animations to jurors.104 Second, trial preparation is more time
consuming because of the increased use of experts, expenses for experts
and other witnesses, and higher hourly rates for attorneys.105 These factors
pressure the government and the defense to settle.106 Third, plea bargain
expectations for prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers are different.107
As opposed to 30 years ago, all see trial as failure.108 Prosecutors find that
a case must be flawless to go to trial and believe it is worse for one’s career
to lose a case at trial compared to not taking cases to trial.109 Conrad and
Clements say this pressures more prosecutors to plea bargain.110 Judges
also find that trials leave more room for reversible error, so they also want
more plea bargaining.111
a. Improved Technology and Investigations
Professor Darryl Brown argues that trial rates in criminal cases
decreased from roughly 20% in the 1990s to 3% today not because of broad
discovery regimes that led to the same decrease in civil cases but because
law enforcement is more adept at gathering more and stronger evidence
against criminal defendants.112 Technology and investigative tactics have
made criminal cases stronger for the government.113 Today, with
witnesses, audio and video recordings, currency recovered after arrest, and
“buy money” used in stings, prosecutors with sufficient resources can more

103. See id. at 150–51.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 152.
106. See id. at 152–53.
107. See id. at 154.
108. See id. at 155.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 154–55.
112. See Darryl K. Brown, How to Make Criminal Trials Disappear Without Pretrial
Discovery, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155, 192–93 (2018).
113. See id. at 174–76.
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easily evaluate and charge crimes.114 With stronger evidence, prosecutors
today can also offer incentives for codefendants in gang or conspiracy
cases to cooperate.115
Brown also makes the case that federal plea rates are high because of
mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines, and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent that permits prosecutors to hard bargain with defendants.116 For
instance, it is legally permissible for prosecutors to charge offense A, offer
a plea agreement with range of sentence Y, but, if the defendant declines,
supersede the formal accusation with charge B, which could double or
triple sentence Y.117 This is easier today because the government has
stronger evidence.118 Stronger evidence makes it difficult for defense
attorneys to bargain for a deviation from standard plea agreements.119
Literature on the vanishing trial is expansive. Traditional explanations
have been updated with newer evidence post-Booker. The impact of
technology and stronger evidence have contributed to plea bargaining
hegemony.120 Although scholars have discussed the impact on public
defense practice, they have neglected training alternatives.121 Race has also
not been closely analyzed in the conversation of trial reduction.122

114. See id. at 185 (quoting Besiki L. Kutateladze, Victoria Z. Lawson & Nancy R.
Andiloro, Does Evidence Really Matter? An Exploratory Analysis of the Role of Evidence in
Plea Bargaining in Felony Drug Cases, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 431, 433 (2015)).
115. See id. at 186.
116. See id. at 193, 198–99.
117. See id. at 193 (first citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978)
(affirming prosecutor’s decision to add charge carrying life sentence after defendant
declined a plea offer carrying a five-year sentence); then citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
504, 507–09 (1984) (finding a prosecutor is not required to abide by original plea bargain
offer after defendant accepts it but before court accepts it); and then citing United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (finding a prosecutor’s decision to add felony charge after
defendant declines to plead guilty to a misdemeanor not constitutionally vindictive)).
118. See id. at 184.
119. See Adam Robison, Waiver of Plea Agreement Statements: A Glimmer of Hope to
Limit Plea Statement Usage to Impeachment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 691 (2005) (noting
that a “prosecutor would benefit more when she has a strong case against the accused,
because she is in a better position to obtain what she wants under the terms of the plea
agreement”).
120. See Brown, supra note 112, at 174–76, 187.
121. David Patton and Joseph Hall explain the impact of low trial rates on AFPDs but do
not propose any training possibilities for improvement. See Patton, supra note 26; see also
Hall, supra note 26.
122. David Patton explains that defendants of color are more prevalent in today’s federal
system, but his article stops there. See Patton, supra note 26, at 2600–01.
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II. MANDATORY MINIMUMS, SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
AND FAST-TRACK PROGRAMS
This Part provides a brief history of mandatory minimum punishments
for drug offenses, federal sentencing guidelines, and fast-track programs. It
applies each to federal defense in the Tucson sector of the District of
Arizona. Contemporary practice in drug cases shows the plea bargaining
machine at work.
A. How the Plea Bargaining Machine Reduced Trial Rates123
i. Mandatory Minimums for Drug Offenses
The mandatory minimum sentencing laws in effect today for drug crimes
were not the first.124 In 1956, Congress enacted the Narcotics Control Act,
which established a regime of compulsory punishments for the most
serious drug importation and distribution offenses.125 It provided statutory
minimums based on the controlled substance and the number of a
defendant’s prior drug convictions.126 In 1970, Congress implemented the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.127 It included the
repeal of statutory mandatory sentencing provisions for drug offenses
except those applicable to a special category of professional criminals.128
Today’s statutory penalty scheme for drug offenses originated in the
1980s when events and public opinion gave impetus to sweeping criminal

123. Technology has contributed to declining trial rates. The advent of smart phones and
heavier reliance on digital communication makes prosecution easier because evidence
remains on a phone. See Brown, supra note 112, at 180 (finding that technology has helped
the government obtain more incriminating evidence, which, if shared with the defense, leads
to more guilty pleas). Although the Supreme Court held that people have an expectation of
privacy in cell phones, authorities may conduct a cursory search under the border search
authority. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 387 (2014) (finding an interest in
preventing destruction of evidence did not justify dispensing with warrant requirement for
searches of cell phone data). But see, e.g., United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2019) (border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
authorizes warrantless searches of a cell phone only to determine whether the phone
contains contraband; a broader search cannot be justified by the particular purposes served
by the exception).
124. See Molly Gil, Correcting Course: Lessons from the 1970 Repeal of Mandatory
Minimums, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 55, 55 (2008) (“It is not the first time in American history
that they have been used and failed.”).
125. See id. at 57 (“Sentences for drug traffickers were increased to a five-year minimum
for a first offense and a ten-year minimum for all subsequent violations.”).
126. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 103, 70 Stat. 567, 568. The
penalty provisions also prohibited probation and parole. See id.
127. See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, Competing
Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 318 (1993).
128. See id.
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law reform.129 Popular tragedies such as the death from cocaine overdose
of University of Maryland’s basketball star and first draft pick of the
Boston Celtics, Len Bias, convinced many that the United States faced a
drug crisis.130 Drug abuse became the most important public concern,
surpassing economic problems.131 Congress believed authorities processed
major drug traffickers quickly through the system, only to see them return
to criminal activities because of lenient sentencing practices.132 U.S.
society believed rehabilitation of offenders failed and harsh punishments
were necessary.133
Congress looked for ways to decrease the supply and demand for drugs
through statutorily mandated sentencing provisions such as the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986.134 This Act imposes severe mandatory minimum
penalties for drug trafficking.135 It requires five-year mandatory minimum
penalties to “‘serious’ traffickers and . . . ten-year mandatory minimum
penalties to ‘major’ traffickers.”136 Drug quantity identifies the offender.137
For example, possession for distribution of one kilogram or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin triggers a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment without
parole.138 Possession for distribution of five kilograms or more of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine also
triggers a ten-year sentence.139 Congress provided five-year mandatory
minimum penalties for those involved in trafficking smaller quantities.140
Trafficking in 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of heroin, or 500 grams or more of a mixture or

129. See Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); see also 132 CONG. REC. 26,436 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hawkins)
(“Drugs pose a clear and present danger to America’s national security. If for no other
reason we should be addressing this on an emergency basis.”).
130. See Saris, supra note 129.
131. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 315.
132. See id.
133. See Saris, supra note 129, at 4; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIME JUSTICE SYSTEM 7
(1991) (discussing a shift away from a rehabilitative model toward controlling crime using
“more certain, less disparate, and more appropriately punitive” sentences).
134. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 315; see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to -5 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)).
135. See Saris, supra note 129, at 3.
136. Id. at 3–4 (quoting U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 6 (2002)).
137. See id.
138. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i) (1988
& Supp. III 1991)).
139. See id.
140. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
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substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine triggered the five-year
mandatory minimum.141
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also harshly punishes defendants with
prior convictions for offenses that resulted in death or serious injury, or if
distribution was to a vulnerable person.142 If a defendant has a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense, the Act sets the mandatory minimum
at twice the otherwise applicable number of years.143 If death or serious
bodily injury resulted from a controlled substance, a mandatory minimum
of 20 years would apply.144 The 1986 Act also requires a mandatory
minimum punishment if the drug distribution was to a person under age 21,
to a pregnant female, or involved a minor in the distribution process.145
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, a similarly harsh law, includes a
provision that makes mandatory minimum sentences for drug distribution
and importation offenses applicable to convictions for attempts and
conspiracies to commit those offenses.146 It also amended 21 U.S.C. § 844
to make crack cocaine the only drug with a mandatory minimum penalty
for a first offense of simple possession.147
ii. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Criticism of regularity and severity in criminal punishment dates back
centuries, to as early as the 1700s.148 Back then, detractors voiced
concerns about rising crime rates to illustrate that the justice system did not
appropriately sanction individuals convicted of criminal offenses.149 These

141. See id. The legislative history suggests that the five-year mandatory minimum would
apply to mid-level drug dealers (called “serious traffickers”). See H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at
17 (1986).
142. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(2).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B).
145. Id. §§ 859, 860, 861.
146. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4377.
147. See Nekima Levy-Pounds, Can These Bones Live? A Look at the Impacts of the War
on Drugs on Poor African-American Children and Families, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 353, 358 (2010) (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2004)). The Act also made
possession of more than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base
punishable by at least five years in prison. The five-year minimum penalty also applies to
possession of more than three grams of cocaine base if the defendant has a prior conviction
for crack cocaine possession and to possession of more than one gram of crack if the
defendant has two or more prior crack possession convictions. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 § 6371.
148. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 307.
149. See id. (first citing DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL
ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 52–53, 61–62 (1971); then citing MICHEL
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observers argued deterrence was ineffective in reducing crime.150 They
saw capital punishment as the sanction of choice, but juries seldom
imposed it.151
Reforms moved sentencing policy toward fixed terms of
imprisonment.152 By the early 1800s, most states adopted criminal statutes
with fixed sentence terms.153
This marked change to potential
rehabilitation; lengthy imprisonment periods would serve deterrence and
rehabilitation purposes.154 Congress ratified an indeterminate sentencing
system in 1910 with a parole board deciding release dates.155 This system
existed until the 1970s, “when reformers denounced the rehabilitative
model as ineffective, capricious, and discriminatory.”156
From the 1910s until the enactment of the sentencing guidelines in 1984,
no system provided consistency.157 Judges had substantial discretion in
deciding the sentence for any person accused of a crime.158 Outside of
statutory maximums and constitutional limits, judges applied their own
sense of justice.159 Even the United States Supreme Court tried to
ameliorate this problem in 1949 when the Court ruled judges should
“consider ‘the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life
and characteristics.’”160 This directive supplied no uniformity. Judges
continued to differ on the length of punishment for any person’s crime.161
Sentencing for similar crimes led to different results.162 For instance,

FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 7–23 (Alan Sheridan, trans.
1977)).
150. See id. (citing FOUCAULT, supra note 149, at 7–23).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 308 (citing Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819).
156. Id. (first citing Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); then citing DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION
STUDIES 1 (1975)).
157. See Frank O. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a
Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1051–55 (2001).
158. See Jane A. Dall, “A Question for Another Day”: The Constitutionality of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1617, 1620
(2003).
159. See id. (citing THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 10.1, at 1685 (2002)).
160. See id. at 1619–20 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
161. See id. at 1620.
162. See id.
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judges imposed longer sentences on people of color compared to whites for
the same crime, even when both had similar backgrounds.163
The changes that led to the present system originated when Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, propelled by critics of the rehabilitative model,
introduced a bill in 1975 calling for a judicial commission to promote
guidelines for federal courts to address sentencing disparities.164 The
Senate, driven by similar concerns, tried to revise the criminal code but
failed.165 They instead took the sentencing reform legislation from this
effort and inserted it into a “criminal law-strengthening package.”166 The
Senate eventually passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,167
which included the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), early that
year.168 The House of Representatives ratified it, and President Reagan
signed it into law on October 12.169
The SRA included the sentencing guidelines,170 which “provide[d] for
the development of guidelines that will further the basic purposes of
criminal punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and
rehabilitation.”171 The guidelines’ basic purpose is to provide consistency
and predictability to the federal sentencing system.172 To achieve this goal,
the district judge determines the appropriate sentencing guidelines range
by: “(1) [F]inding the applicable offense level and offender category and
then (2) consulting a table that lists proportionate sentencing ranges . . . at
the intersections of rows (marking offense levels) and columns (marking
offender categories).”173 The intersection of criminal history and offense
level determines the sentencing range for the criminal defendant.174 This
mechanical process should lead to uniformity across all federal districts,

163. See id.
164. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 309–10 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 37,562 (1975)).
165. See id. at 310.
166. Id. (citing S. Res. 1762, 98th Cong. 2d Sess, 130 CONG. REC. 1649 (1984)).
167. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 209–210, 98
Stat. 1837, 1986–87 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C).
168. See William S. Laufer, Culpability and the Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L.
REV. 1049, 1053 n.13 (1992) (stating that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) is
found in Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553).
169. See Wilkins et al., supra note 127, at 310.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
171. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
172. See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft on Setting Forth Justice
Department’s Sentencing Policies to All Fed. Prosecutors (July 28, 2003), 15 F ED. SENT’G
REP. 375, 375, 2003 WL 22208857.
173. See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 265 (2012).
174. See Quincy H. Ferrill, Enhancement Without a Cause: United States v. Serfass and
Its Erasure of the Scienter Requirement, 53 TEX. TECH L. REV. 311, 315 (2021).

2022]

CRUSHING THE SOUL

719

but that has not been the case.175 In the Author’s experience, judges, even
in the same courthouse, disagree, sometimes substantially, over appropriate
sentencing decisions.
The SRA required judges to impose a sentence within the guidelines
range absent circumstances that justify a departure.176 This changed after
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker, held that the guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment and made them advisory.177 After Booker,
opinions empowered judges to ignore the mechanical method of finding the
appropriate guideline range when imposing sentences.178 Despite this new
freedom, judges still impose within guidelines sentences in approximately
80% of decisions.179
Research into trial rates after the Supreme Court held the guidelines
constitutional in 1989180 shows trial rates decreased.181 Plea bargaining
rates remained between 84% and 85% from 1984 to 1989.182 They climbed
soon after, reaching 94% by 2001.183 In 2019, the plea rate in federal court
was 90%.184 The significance of these increases shows the guidelines were

175. See Emily W. Andersen, Note, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing Family
Responsibilities to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1506–07 (2015)
(citing AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWS., UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004: AN
EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 190 (2004), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/Sentencing
Guidelines_3.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN82-FSEB]).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
177. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
178. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346 (2007) (finding a sentence within
a properly calculated guideline may be presumptively reasonable); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (finding a district court can justify a sentence outside a
properly calculated guideline range based on the disagreement with the policy judgments of
the Sentencing Commission undergirding a particular guideline); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 4547 (2007) (stating appellate courts may not presume that a sentence outside the
Guidelines range is unreasonable).
179. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1682
n.274 (2012) (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.N (2011)) (“The precise rate is 82.6%, including 54.5% within the range,
26.3% below the range based on a government motion, and 1.8% above the range.”).
180. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding the United States
Sentencing Commission constitutional and that Sentencing Guidelines represented a
constitutional delegation of powers).
181. See John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, Does Criminal Diversion
Contribute to the Vanishing Civil Trial?, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 443, 453 (2013).
182. See id.
183. See id. (citing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 223 tbl.9.1 (2003)).
184. See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most
Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2F1Qxn7
[https://perma.cc/3WRL-NQP8]. And for those defendants who choose to go to trial, the
conviction rate is greater than 80%. See id.
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a factor in persuading lawyers in more cases to advise clients to accept plea
agreements instead of going to trial.
iii. Fast-Track Programs
Fast-track programs give prosecutors the power to offer defendants a
reduced sentence in exchange for a pre-indictment guilty plea.185 The
purpose of these programs is to “facilitate prompt and easy disposition of
cases to reduce the burdens they impose” on districts.186 These burdens
included growing numbers of defendants leading to problems of physical
space and staff.187 There was insufficient space to house detained
defendants and not enough prosecutors to handle all cases brought to them
in districts along the southwestern border.188 Prosecutors used fast-track, a
more formalized version of the flip-flop program used in the Southern
District of California since the 1970s, to ameliorate the problem.189 The
United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for the Southern District of
California implemented the first fast-track program in 1993.190 It applied
to immigration defendants charged with violating 8 U.S.C § 1326(b).191
This law carried a maximum penalty of five or 15 years, depending on
whether the court convicted the defendant of an aggravated felony.192
Under this first fast-track policy, defendants could enter a pre-indictment
plea to violating § 1326(a), which carries a maximum two-year sentence.193
To take advantage of the favorable plea, the accused had to waive

185. See generally Erin T. Middleton, Fast-Track to Disparity: How Federal Sentencing
Policies Along the Southwest Border Are Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines and
Violating Equal Protection, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 827.
186. United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Doug Keller, Re-Thinking Illegal Entry and Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65,
90–91 (2012) (citing Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 751 (1973)). In the flip-flop program
undocumented crossers who had been previously excluded would be charged with a twocount complaint for misdemeanor illegal entry (which has a six-month statutory-maximum
penalty) and felony illegal re-entry (two-year statutory-maximum penalty). If the person
agreed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor count of illegal entry before formal accusation the
prosecutor dropped the felony illegal re-entry charge. See id. The agreement benefitted the
defendant and the government. The defendant avoided a felony conviction and received a
lower statutory-maximum penalty. See id. The program efficiently processed cases by
avoiding the district court dockets and grand jury proceedings. See id.
190. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1995).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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indictment,194 enter the plea at the first hearing before the court,195 waive
sentencing appeal,196 stipulate that the guideline range exceeds the twoyear maximum,197 and agree not to argue for departures or downward
adjustments.198
It was not long before fast-track programs grew. The Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act mandated the United States Attorney General to set
standards for fast-track programs nationally within six months.199 Attorney
General John Ashcroft sent memos to all federal prosecutors.200 The
memos authorized them to agree to downward departures when a fast-track
program and details for implementation are in place.201 The memos
explained that fast-track programs are reserved only for rare situations,
including when a district’s resources are limited by a larger than normal
volume of particular types of cases.202

194. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b) (stating that a person may waive an indictment to a felony
offense “by information if the defendant — in open court and after being advised of the
nature of the defendant’s rights — waives prosecution by indictment.”).
195. See Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d at 759.
196. The Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant can elect to waive important
constitutional and statutory rights during the plea-bargaining process. See United States v.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995). This includes the waiver of a sentencing appeal in a
plea agreement. See United States v. Allison, 59 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United
States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731
(4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1957 (1995); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d
1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 652 (1994); United States v.
DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 38 F.3d 394 (1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567–68 (5th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829–30 (8th Cir. 1992).
197. See Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d at 759.
198. See id.
199. Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (“Not later than 180 days
after the enactment of this Act, the United States Sentencing Commission shall — . . . (2)
promulgate, pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code — . . . (B) a policy
statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels if the Government
files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the
Attorney General and the United States Attorney . . . .”).
200. See Rebecca Schendel Norris, Fast-Track Disparities in the Post-Booker World: ReExamining Illegal Reentry Sentencing Policies, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 747, 756 (2006); see
also Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., on Department Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing to all Fed.
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm
[https://perma.cc/6GX6-C78M]; Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of
Just., on Setting Forth Justice Department’s “Fast Track” Policies to all Fed. Prosecutors
(Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Aschroft Memorandum, Setting Forth], reprinted in 16 FED.
SENT’G REP. 134 (2003).
201. See Norris, supra note 200, at 756–57.
202. See Aschroft Memorandum, Setting Forth, supra note 200.
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Fast-track programs permit prosecutors to “offer lower sentences in
exchange for guilty pleas” to promote efficiency.203 In the District of
Arizona, fast-track programs are available for reactive drug cases,
immigration violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and alien smuggling under 8
U.S.C. § 1324.204 Absent unusual circumstances, plea agreements for drug
cases in Arizona are “fast-track.”205 Prosecutors offer four points off for
government savings (the “fast-track” reduction), three points off for
acceptance of responsibility, and two points off for safety valve. 206 A
standard plea offer in a drug case also permits the defendant to argue for
variances and minimal or minor role adjustments, but no other
departures.207
B. How Mandatory Minimums, Sentencing Guidelines, and Fast-Track
Programs Fuel the Plea Bargaining Machine in Arizona Drug Cases
i. National Charging Policy and Impact of Defense Attorney Advice
On January 29, 2021, Acting Attorney General Monty Wilkinson
reinstated Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2010 criminal charging
policy.208
The policy requires prosecutors to make individualized
assessments for charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing in each case.209

203. See Joy Anne Boyd, Commentary, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of
Justice’s Plea Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor’s Power Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 598 (2004).
204. This is based on my trial practice in the Evo DeConcini U.S. Courthouse in Tucson,
Arizona.
205. See Norris, supra note 200, at 748, 757 (citing Government’s Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for a Non-Guideline Sentence Based on the
Existence of Fast-Track Programs at 46, United States v. Krukowski, No. 04 Cr. 1308
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 10, 2005)).
206. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUEL § 5K3.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2022) (fasttrack savings); see also id. § 3E1.1 (acceptance of responsibility); id. § 5C1.2 (safety valve).
207. Id. § 3B1.2.
208. See Memorandum from the Acting Att’y Gen., Interim Guidance on Prosecutorial
Discretion, Charging, and Sentencing to all Fed. Prosecutors (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1362411/download
[https://perma.cc/6H7Y-F5CR].
The Acting Attorney General was Monty Wilkinson. See Sheena Foye & James R. Wyrsch,
DOJ Issues Interim Policy Allowing for Prosecutorial Discretion in Criminal Prosecutions,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/criminal/practice/2021/doj-issues-interim-policy-allowing-for-prosecutorialdiscretion-in-criminal-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/8UEP-F9QC].
209. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., on Department Policy on
Charging and Sentencing to all Fed. Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/files/holdermemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7M8-5R9A]. Specifically:
[C]harging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing must be made on the
merits of each case, taking into account an individualized assessment of the
defendant’s conduct and criminal history and the circumstances relating to
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Wilkinson’s directive is less severe compared to previous orders under
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions but has not changed drug courier
treatment.210 Under the new policy, the government continues to prosecute
low-level couriers under mandatory minimum sentencing laws.211
Following national policy, federal prosecutors in Arizona file charges
capturing the full weight of drugs seized by agents. These charges, more
often than not, trigger mandatory minimum punishments.212
As of this writing, Attorney General Merrick Garland, Wilkinson’s
permanent replacement, can reinstate Eric Holder’s 2013 directive, which
forbade prosecutors to pursue charges carrying mandatory minimums
absent specific circumstances.213 Such change is not expected to increase
trial rates.214 This is illustrated during this Author’s experience as an
AFPD. This Author’s first two years of federal practice, 2015 to early
2017, coincided with the application of the 2013 Holder Memo. Clients
accused of drug trafficking during that period did not reject plea
agreements at higher rates compared to clients charged under Attorney
Generals Jeff Sessions or William Barr.215 The bulk of my cases during
that period consisted of drug cases positively affected by the Holder Memo.
Prosecutorial and judicial practice impact attorney recommendations to
clients. Defense lawyers correctly advise clients that if they go to trial,
judges are less likely to take two points off for acceptance of responsibility,

commission of the offense (including the impact of the crime on victims), the
needs of the communities we serve, and federal resources and priorities.
See id.
210. Session’s policy required prosecutors to pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense. Memorandum from Att’y Gen., Department Charging and Sentencing Policy to all
Fed. Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/
download [https://perma.cc/R874-3UMK] (“[P]rosecutors should charge and pursue the
most serious, readily provable offense.”).
211. Absent explicit reversal of the May 10, 2017, directive, prosecutors continue to
indict defendants under charges requiring mandatory minimum sentences.
212. The quantity of drugs required to trigger mandatory minimum amounts are the
following: heroin (100 grams (5 years), 1 kilogram (10 years)); cocaine (500 grams (5
years), 5 kilograms (10 years)); methamphetamine mixture (50 grams (5 years), 500 grams
(10 years)); pure methamphetamine (5 grams (5 years), 50 grams (10 years)); and marijuana
(100 kilograms or 100 plants (5 years), 1,000 kilograms or 1,000 plants (10 years)). 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–(B).
213. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 209.
214. See Conrad & Clements, supra note 24, at 139 (“During Holder’s tenure as Attorney
General, jury trials of drug prosecutions decreased by forty-nine percent from 932 jury trials
in 2009 to 473 trials in 2015.”).
215. For example, the trial rate in Arizona in 2016, in which 44.2% of cases were drug
related, was only 0.7%. see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET,
FISCAL YEAR 2016, DISTRICT OF ARIZONA fig.A, tbls.1, 5 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-districtcircuit/2016/az16.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ6D-FF9L].
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not give safety-valve relief, and add two points for obstruction of justice if
they testify and are found guilty by a jury.216 Defense lawyers also advise
what prosecutors may do if a client exercises her right to trial: supersede
the formal accusation with more charges or allege a sentencing
enhancement such as prior convictions.217 These recommendations are
correct: prosecutors make good on their promises to supersede indictments
or allege sentencing enhancements. They also heavily influence clients to
waive their rights to a jury trial and accept a plea agreement.
If the accused signs a plea agreement and is contrite about the crime
during the pre-sentence interview, the guidelines guarantee two points off
for acceptance of responsibility and almost always three points if the
offense level is 16 or higher.218 The third point for acceptance of
responsibility, controlled by the government, is guaranteed in plea
agreements for routine drug cases in Arizona. Plea agreements also
guarantee four points off for the fast-track program.219 These incentives,
even in cases that do not require mandatory minimums, make it difficult for
defendants to reject plea agreements because the potential prison time
reduced is substantial.220
ii. Drug Cases in Arizona
In 2019, drugs constituted 28% of all criminal filings in federal courts.221
In the same year, drug cases constituted 16.3% of all federal criminal

216. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUEL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2022)
(acceptance of responsibility); see also id. § 5C1.2 (safety valve); id. § 3C1.1 (obstruction of
justice); 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
217. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutors have wide discretion to decide
whom and when to prosecute. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)
(“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to
prosecute.” (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982))). The Court
has long held that, “so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
218. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUEL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2022).
219. See id. § 5K3.1.
220. See Innocence Staff, Report: Guilty Pleas on the Rise, Criminal Trials on the
Decline, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.innocenceproject.org/guiltypleas-on-the-rise-criminal-trials-on-the-decline/ [https://perma.cc/RM7R-CRL9] (noting that
“a defendant is more likely to receive a lesser sentence if they choose a plea deal rather than
a trial”).
221. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 [https://perma.cc/8GWR-7XRT]
(last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
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filings in Arizona.222 The rate was almost identical in the Tucson sector, at
16.1%.223 Immigration crimes constituted 65.5% of all cases that year in
Arizona.224 As of the writing of this Article, drug cases constitute 54% of
the Author’s caseload. All but one client charged with drugs face
mandatory minimum punishments if convicted.
Because of the land border with Mexico, most federal drug cases in
Arizona involve arrest at ports of entry, where people routinely smuggle
drugs to the United States in cars, their clothing, or bodies, as they enter
through pedestrian lanes.225 People caught smuggling drugs are also
arrested by federal officers at immigration checkpoints,226 in areas near the
border, and on American Indian reservations.227 Occasionally, DEA agents
arrest people in Phoenix or Tucson after undercover investigations, but
these make up a minority of drug cases.228 Seizures of methamphetamine,
heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, and marijuana are the most prevalent in drug
arrests.229
Based on this Author’s professional experience, most in-custody
defendants accused of drug trafficking in the District of Arizona are foreign
nationals with little to no community ties to the United States.230 Incustody defendants accused of drug trafficking also include large numbers
222. See OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE CT., DIST. OF ARIZ., DISTRICT OF ARIZONA ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2019 14–18 (2019), https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/FY19%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TFY-Q6GL].
223. See id. at 19.
224. See id. at 18.
225. In most cases, agents find drugs concealed in natural voids in a car or non-factory
compartments. They also find drugs inside tires, car seats, and trunks of cars. Pedestrians
hide drugs in clothing and even in private body cavities.
226. See Immigration Checkpoints Catching More Drugs than People,
SANTANVALLEY.COM (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.santanvalley.com/san-tan-valley-areainformation/arizona-news/immigration-checkpoints-catching-more-drugs-than-people
[http://perma.cc/P2JT-3PUZ].
227. See Cartel Operators Used Indian Reservation as Smuggling Pass-Through, POLICE
MAG. (May 19, 2011), https://www.policemag.com/347866/cartel-operators-used-indianreservation-as-smuggling-pass-through [https://perma.cc/6TUX-42NN].
228. See Rafael Carranza, Arizona Border with Mexico Sees Most Drug-Trafficking
Arrests, Report Says, ARIZ. CENTRAL (June 21, 2017, 8:24 AM), https://www.
azcentral.com/story/news/politics/border-issues/2017/06/20/arizona-border-mexico-drugsmuggling-arrests/382553001/ [https://perma.cc/LFA6-JSLN].
229. See DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT 2 (2021), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%20
2020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY8SAW6R].
230. This Author has not found any studies documenting the citizenship of in-custody
pre-trial detainees in the District of Arizona. On a broader scale, 83.5% of all Bureau of
Prisons inmate are U.S. citizens. Inmate Citizenship, FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Mar. 12, 2022),
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_citizenship.jsp
[https://perma.cc/R795-FA49].
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of legal permanent residents and citizens whom judges believe will not
appear for future court proceedings.231
Because most drug couriers do not have prior convictions, only a small
minority fail to qualify for the safety-valve law.232 For the unfortunate
minority who do not qualify, prosecutors sometimes offer a plea requiring a
five-year mandatory minimum term in prison.233 To obtain comparable
benefits, in rare cases, prosecutors require a proffer session for defendants
231. Non-U.S. citizen clients who entered the country with a visa typically have few ties
to the United States. Even though most live near the border in Northern Mexico, judges
rarely release them from custody. Judges do not believe they will return to court. Mexico
does not permit U.S. Marshals, who execute failure to appear warrants for federal judges, to
travel to Mexico to execute warrants. See Roberto J. Ramos, An Update on the Pursuit of
Fugitives Who Flee into Mexico, TEX. PROSECUTOR (Oct. 2012), https://www.tdcaa.com/
journal/an-update-on-the-pursuit-of-fugitives-who-flee-into-mexico/ [https://perma.cc/C2UF
-Z6YQ]. Mexican authorities can, however, pursue people facing American arrest warrants
for drug cases. See id. Clients with permanent U.S. residency mostly have strong ties to the
United States. The majority live, work, and raise families in U.S. cities. Consequently, most
judges in Arizona release them from custody pending trial.
232. The safety valve allows a court to sentence a person below a mandatory minimum
sentence and to reduce the person’s offense level under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by two points. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUEL § 5C1.2
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2022). The law, as originally passed, required a person to meet the
following criteria: (1) Not have more than one point in criminal history; (2) Any prior
conviction cannot have involved a firearm, violence, or a credible threat of violence; (3)
Any prior conviction cannot have resulted in death or serious bodily injury; (4) The person
cannot have been an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the drug activity; and (5)
Before sentencing, the person must have truthfully told law enforcement about his or her
involvement in the crime. The First Step Act increased the availability of the safety valve by
making it easier to meet the first requirement of little prior criminal history. Before the First
Step Act, a person could have no more than one criminal history point. This generally
means no more than one prior conviction in the last ten years for which the person received
either probation or less than 60 days of prison. The First Step Act permitted eligibility if, in
addition to meeting requirements (2) to (5) above, the defendant does not have: (A) more
than four criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a one
point offense, as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines; (B) a prior three point
offense, as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (C) a prior two point violent
offense, as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.
5194 (2018). Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Lopez,
998 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 2021), which greatly expanded the safety valve. The court held:
As a matter of first impression, we must interpret the “and” joining subsections
(A), (B), and (C) under § 3553(f)(1). If § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” carries its ordinary
conjunctive meaning, a criminal defendant must have (A) more than four
criminal-history points, (B) a prior three-point offense, and (C) a prior two-point
violent offense, cumulatively, before he or she is barred from safety-valve relief
under § 3553(f)(1).
Id.
233. This is not an uncommon practice. See United States v. Tran, No. 10-00269 HG-01,
2015 WL 4911457, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 14, 2015) (explaining the government filed
information requiring a mandatory minimum of ten years on drug case based on prior a prior
conviction, subjecting defendant to a ten-year mandatory minimum. Defendant pled to an
offense requiring no less than the five-year mandatory minimum).
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to describe co-conspirator involvement as a pre-condition for negotiating a
favorable plea agreement.234 This is a problem for couriers because most
do not know of others involved in drug trafficking.235 Drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) recruit people to drive drug-laden cars across the
border who are not involved in cartel operations.236 This way, recruits
cannot provide information if agents arrest them and offer opportunities to
inculpate others in exchange for favorable treatment such as dismissed
charges, lenient sentencing recommendations, or no filing of charges.237 It
is not in the interest of DTOs to use their own members to cross narcotics
into the United States.238
Due to required five- or ten-year mandatory minimum punishments with
scant prospect of qualifying for the safety valve after trial conviction,
people facing mandatory minimums in drug cases rarely exercise their
rights to a jury trial.239 Instead, most sign a plea agreement and hope for a
time-served sentence after being told by their lawyers they should perform
well under pre-trial services supervision, demonstrate family and
community support, and contrition.
In the Tucson sector of the District of Arizona, judges typically impose
sentences ranging from 24 to 40 months in prison for couriers who smuggle
drugs in cars, sign plea agreements, are in-custody, and are safety-valve
234. See United States v. Kent, 649 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the prosecutor
was permitted not only to require cooperation as a condition of the guilty plea but also to
file an additional sentencing enhancement if defendant did not sign plea agreement).
235. See Timothy P. Tobin, Note, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1066 (1999) (citing Ralph Kistner,
Commentary, 3 FED SENT’G REP. 231, 231 (1991) (“[C]ouriers most likely lack knowledge
of the scope and structure of the overall drug scheme or the activities of others within the
scheme.”)).
236. See Adam B. Weber, The Courier Conundrum: The High Costs of Prosecuting LowLevel Drug Couriers and What We Can Do About Them, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1749
(2019) (“Drug couriers often lack substantial ties to drug-trafficking organizations, which
generally recruit vulnerable individuals to act as couriers and mules.”).
237. See Walter I. Gonçalves, Jr., Banished and Overcriminalized: Critical Race
Perspectives of Illegal Entry and Drug Courier Prosecutions, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 57
n.338 (2020) (citing John S. Austin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance:
The Power and Authority of Judicial Review — United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 263, 274 (1993) (noting that drug couriers have little knowledge of operations))
(explaining trusted people in drug organizations do not tell couriers details about drug
trafficking). Low level couriers are “unable to supply ‘substantial assistance’ and must serve
mandatory minimum sentences if convicted.” See Austin, supra.
238. See Weber, supra note 236, at 1765 (“These low-level drug couriers have little to no
involvement in the larger drug-trafficking operation and, as a result, possess limited
information of value to law enforcement in the event that they are apprehended.”).
239. It is extremely difficult to qualify for the safety valve after trial. One example of a
success story is described in United States v. Sherpa. 110 F.3d 656, 662 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding a court may reconsider facts necessary to the jury verdict in determining whether to
apply the “safety valve”).
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eligible.240 Sentences are rarely over four years.241 Couriers who choose
trial and are convicted have minuscule chances of qualifying for the safety
valve and thus face much higher sentences.242
The high percentage of drug cases, nationally and in Arizona, helps
explain minuscule trial rates across the board.243 The other contributing
factor is an increasing rate of criminal filings for another category of case
that rarely results in trial: illegal entry and re-entry.244 In 2019, illegal
entry and re-entry filings constituted 65.5% of all filings in Arizona, a
46.3% increase compared to 2018.245
To summarize, mandatory minimums and the sentencing guidelines
were instituted almost 40 years ago in response to public opinion and the
lack of regularity from sentencing judges. Fast-track programs helped
reduce court time and space in detention centers. All have had the effect of
drastically reducing federal trials, especially in drug and illegal re-entry
cases.
III. STIGMATIZATIONS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS, LATINXS, AND
AMERICAN INDIANS HELPED FACILITATE THE
PLEA BARGAINING MACHINE
Racial minorities constitute the majority of federal criminal
defendants.246 This Part briefly describes the historical exploitation of
African Americans, Latinxs, and American Indians in the United States. It
then explains how the plea bargaining machine generates racial disparities.

240. See Curt Prendergast, Drug-Smuggling Sentencing Vary Wildly Along Mexico
Border, TUSCON.COM (Nov. 9, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/drug-smuggling-sent
ences-vary-wildly-along-mexico-border/article_a45fca2d-b468-5a92-807255f6d073f2b1.html [https://perma.cc/4NY4-9UAP] (finding judges in other southwest
border districts impose harsher sentences for drug crimes).
241. The average sentence for drug trafficking in the District of Arizona in 2020 was 28
months. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET, FISCAL YEAR 2020,
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 11, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-pub
lications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2020/az20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WD6-WRGM] (last visited Jan. 19, 2022).
242. See Sherpa, 110 F.3d at 660.
243. Government plea policies impact trial rates and workload. See M. Elaine Nugent &
Mark L. Miller, Basic Factors in Determining Prosecutor Workload, PROSECUTOR, Aug.
2002, at 32, 33 (“Policies regarding plea negotiations, such as ‘no plea’ policies, further
impact caseload and trial rates.”).
244. See infra Section IV.D.
245. See OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE CT., supra note 222, at 18.
246. In 2017, 53.2% of all persons convicted of a federal offense were Latinx, while
21.5% were white, and 21.1% were Black. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2017/2017
SB_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9VG-8LQ6].
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Conscious racism paved the way for unconscious racism prevalent in
today’s criminal justice system.
A. Exploitation of Racial Minorities and Resulting Stereotypes247
i. African Americans
Slavery was foundational to the United States’s economic ascension.248
During the Atlantic slave trade, from approximately 1526 to 1867, whites
shipped 12.5 million slaves from Africa to the Americas.249 Nearly 2
million did not make the voyage, but 10.7 million arrived.250 Slavery
endured for almost 250 years.251 Just before the American Civil War ended
the practice, almost 4 million individuals were enslaved.252
Slavery was a violent, degrading institution. Whites whipped slaves
routinely.253 Women slaves were exploited by their white masters in
chattel slavery.254 Patriarchal culture permitted women to be treated as
property.255 As early as the adoption of partus sequitur ventrem into
Virginia law in 1662,256 society classified the children born of sexual

247. Fortunately, there is literature on how criminal defense lawyers can educate
themselves about implicit racial bias and practice in a way that mitigate its affects. See
Walter I. Gonçalves, Jr., Narrative, Culture, and Individuation: A Criminal Defense
Lawyer’s Race-Conscious Approach to Reduce Implicit Bias for Latinxs, 18 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 333, 335–36 n.12 (2020).
248. See generally EDWARD BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2014) (noting that U.S. commerce and economic
success came from the slave trade economy).
249. See Steven Mintz, Historical Context: Facts About the Slave Trade and Slavery,
GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HIST., https://www.gilderlehrman.org/content/historicalcontext-facts-about-slave-trade-and-slavery [https://perma.cc/FFW7-ZBET] (last visited
Mar. 20, 2022).
250. See id.
251. See Laurel E. Fletcher, What Can International Transitional Justice Offer U.S.
Social Justice Movements?, 46 N. KY. L. REV. 132, 133 (2019).
252. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Slavery by the Numbers, ROOT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:01
AM), https://www.theroot.com/slavery-by-the-numbers-1790874492 [https://perma.cc/
7RXL-EY23].
253. See Lea VanderVelde, The Last Legally Beaten Servant in America: From
Compulsion to Coercion in the American Workplace, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727, 769–70
(2016). See generally ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1995).
254. See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 218 (1992).
255. See Kelly C. Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption:
The Victimization of Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 241–42 (1997)
(citing Emily R. Brown, Changing the Marital Rape Exemption: I Am Chattel(?!); Hear Me
Roar, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 657, 658 (1995)).
256. Under the doctrine of partus sequitur ventrem, a slave takes “the status of his or her
mother, regardless of the amount of white, [B]lack, or Indian ancestry.” See Paul Spruhan, A
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relations between a Black woman and any man as slaves regardless of the
father’s race or status.257 Concurrently, southern communities made it
criminal for white people to marry Black persons.258
Slavery is largely responsible for modern-day inequalities, which help
perpetuate and justify implicit biases.259 For example, social scientists
Keith Payne, Heidi A. Vultich, and Jazmin Brown-Ianuzzi found links
between modern day geographic areas where people held slaves and
implicit racial bias.260 They compared proportions of the enslaved
population according to the 1860 census with county-level implicit race
bias in over 1,400 counties from the Project Implicit database.261 The
empirical study found higher levels of implicit bias in whites in states
where slavery and racial apartheid were more central to their economy and
culture.262 This means the degree of implicit bias is stronger in these areas
of the country compared to all others. Implicit bias is ubiquitous in
criminal justice, including plea bargaining.263
ii. Latinxs
Between 1848 and 1879, whites lynched Mexicans at a rate of 473 per
100,000 of the U.S. population.264 By comparison, whites lynched African

Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 6
(2006).
257. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the OneDrop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 604–05 (2007).
258. See Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place;
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 26–27 (1989).
259. See Heidi A. Vuletich & B. Keith Payne, Stability and Change in Implicit Bias, 30
PSYCH. SCI. 854, 855 (2019) (“[E]conomic dependence on slavery motivated a range of
cultural, legal, economic, and ideological reactions aimed at justifying slavery and, later,
maintaining the racial hierarchy.”).
260. See B. Keith Payne, Heidi A. Vuletich & Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi, Historical
Roots of Implicit Bias in Slavery, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 11693, 11697 (2019).
261. See id.
262. See Eli Jones, The Inherent Implicit Racism in Capital Crime Jury Deliberation, 9
VA. J. CRIM. L. 109, 118 (2020) (citing Payne et al., supra note 260) (“[E]xperts have found
a direct correlation tracing back to slavery with higher levels of implicit bias, with white
people in states which made slavery and racial apartheid more central to their economy and
culture displaying higher levels of implicit bias.”).
263. See Besiki Luka Kutateladze, Nancy R. Andiloro & Brian D. Johnson, Opening
Pandora’s Box: How Does Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 JUST. Q. 398,
399 (2016) (describing how Black defendants are less likely to receive reduced plea offers
and that both Black and Latinxs are more likely to receive plea offers that include jail time).
264. See Peter Yoxall, Comment, The Minuteman Project, Gone in A Minute or Here to
Stay? The Origin, History and Future of Citizen Activism on the United States-Mexico
Border, 37 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 517, 522 (2006) (citing William D. Carrigan & Clive
Webb, The Lynching of Persons of Mexican Origin or Descent in the United States, 1848 to
1928, 37 J. SOC. HIST. 411, 413 (2003)) (arguing that historians often overlook violence
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Americans at 52.8 victims per 100,000 of the population in Mississippi
between 1880 and 1930, the period and region in which African American
lynchings were at their highest level.265 After 1880, the lynchings of
Mexicans declined.266 Nonetheless, whites lynched Mexicans at 27.4
victims per 100,000 people, higher than the number of African Americans
lynched in some southern states.267 Amazingly, the last recorded lynching
of a Mexican in the United States took place on November 16, 1928.268 A
conservative estimate posits 597 lynchings of Mexicans in the United
States, or slightly more.269
Whites lynched Mexicans for myriad reasons. Examples included
“acting ‘uppity,’ taking away jobs, making advances toward . . . white
[women], cheating at cards, practicing ‘witchcraft,’ and refusing to leave
land that Anglos coveted.”270 Whites also justified lynching Mexicans for
acting “too Mexican,” which included “speaking Spanish too loudly or
reminding Anglos too defiantly of their Mexicanness.”271
During the Jim Crow years, or the period after the Civil War era until
1968, whites subjected Latinxs in many jurisdictions to forms of exclusion,
segregation, and disenfranchisement similar to those inflicted on African
Americans.272 In jurisdictions where the criminal justice system excluded
Latinxs from juries, they were, ironically, “legally characterized as white,
but socially treated as non-white.”273 Courts justified their exclusion from
juries based less on ethnicity but on subordinate social status to whites.274
Latinxs in the United States have also been prejudiced and systemically
discriminated against in housing, employment, and education.275 For
example, Mexican Americans before World War II were the victims of

against persons of Mexican descent that occurred in the United States in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
265. See id. at 522–23.
266. See id. at 523.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 523 n.37.
270. See Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 299 (2009) (citing Carrigan & Webb, supra note 264, at 418–
22).
271. See id.
272. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 60 (2012).
273. See Christopher F. Bagnato, Comment, Change Is Needed: How Latinos Are
Affected by the Process of Jury Selection, 29 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 59, 60 (2010).
274. See id.
275. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
855, 888 (1995) (citing PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS: THE AMBIVALENT MINORITY
26 (1993)).
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school and residential segregation and were denied the right to vote in
many parts of Texas.276
Today, largely due to historical exploitations, people hold negative
stereotypes of Latinxs. They perceive them as lazy, lacking in initiative,
unproductive, and on the dole.277 Stereotypes for Latinx criminal
defendants are even worse. Research shows they have been associated
with “innate criminality,”278 typified as “treacherous,”279 drug
traffickers,280 violence-prone,281 “predatory,” and “disposed to chronic
criminal offending.”282 Undoubtedly, these stigmas carry over to criminal
justice.283
iii. American Indians
Before Europeans arrived in the region they called the “New World,”
approximately 15 million American Indian people lived in what is today
the mainland United States.284 U.S. society nearly exterminated American

276. See id. (citing SKERRY, supra note 275, at 39, 44–45).
277. See id. (citing RODOLFO O. DE LA GARZA ET AL., LATINO VOICES: MEXICAN, PUERTO
RICAN & CUBAN PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (1992)).
278. See Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Minority Threat, Crime Control, and Police
Resource Allocation the Southwestern United States, 54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 128, 129
(2008).
279. See CORAMAE RICHEY MANN & MARJORIE S. ZATZ, IMAGES OF COLOR, IMAGES OF
CRIME: READINGS (2d ed., 2002).
280. See Theodore Curry & Guadalupe Corral-Camacho, Sentencing Young Minority
Males for Drug Offenses, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 253, 259 (2008).
281. See KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
282. See Cassia Spohn & Dawn Beichner, Is Preferential Treatment of Female Offenders
a Thing of the Past? A Multisite Study of Gender, Race, and Imprisonment, 11 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 149, 179 (2000).
283. See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) (reviewing several of these
studies and exploring how memory biases may function in legal decision making).
284. See Anthony Peirson Xavier Bothwell, We Live in Their Land: Implications of
Long-Ago Takings of Native American Indian Property, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L.
175, 176 (2000) (citing JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 23 (1993).
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Indians in the wake of the Civil War.285 By 1910, only about 200,000 of
the American Indian population still lived.286
Generations of American Indians have been exploited.287 Government
actions such as extermination, religious persecution, forced migration to
Indian reservations, and systematic removal of American Indian children to
boarding schools caused repeated exposure to trauma.288 The founding
fathers advanced cultural racism toward American Indians.289 In 1779,
George Washington called American Indians “beasts of prey” and told his
subordinates to “attack the Iroquois and lay waste all the settlements
around.”290 He also ordered subordinates “not to consider any overture of
peace before the total ruin of their settlement is effected [sic].”291 Although
today politicians do not use overtly racist rhetoric, American Indians are at
the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder compared to all other racial and
ethnic groups.292

285. See Victor Suthammanont, Note, Judicial Notice: How Judicial Bias Impacts the
Unequal Application of Equal Protection Principles in Affirmative Action Cases, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (2005) (first citing JOHN SELBY, THE CONQUEST OF THE WEST 199240 (Rowman & Littlefield 1976); then citing DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED
KNEE (Henry Holt 2001); and then citing William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on
Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with
Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2002)).
286. See Louise Erdrich, Where I Ought to Be: A Writer’s Sense of Place, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1985, at 6.
287. See Gabrielle Mandeville, Note, Sex Trafficking on Indian Reservations, 51 TULSA
L. REV. 181, 193 (2015) (citing Andrea L. Johnson, Note, A Perfect Storm: The U.S. AntiTrafficking Regime’s Failure to Stop the Sex Trafficking of American Indian Women and
Girls, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 617, 631 (2012)).
288. See id. (citing Alexandra (Sandi) Pierce, Shattered Hearts: The Commercial Sexual
Exploitation of American Indian Women and Girls in Minnesota, MINN. INDIAN WOMEN’S
RESOURCE CTR., 4 (2009), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1027&context=humtraffconf [https://perma.cc/PKQ7-9XD3]).
289. See Andrea Wallace, Patriotic Racism: An Investigation into Judicial Rhetoric and
the Continued Legal Divestiture of Native American Rights, 8 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 91,
99 (2014).
290. See id. (quoting DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF
THE NEW WORLD 119 (1992)).
291. Id. (quoting STANNARD, supra note 290, at 119).
292. See generally Valerie Wilson & Zane Mokhiber, 2016 ACS Shows Stubbornly High
Native American Poverty and Different Degrees of Economic Well-Being for Asian Ethnic
Groups, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 15, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/2016-acsshows-stubbornly-high-native-american-poverty-and-different-degrees-of-economic-wellbeing-for-asian-ethnic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/4KKB-3ALM].
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B. Plea Bargaining Machine’s Racist Outcomes
i. Impact of Mandatory Minimums on Racial Minorities
The crisis of the 1980s that paved the way for mandatory minimum laws
on the books today took place, largely, because of the War on Drugs.293
This actually became a war on African Americans,294 Latinxs, and
American Indians.295 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act may not have been
enacted directly to negatively affect African Americans,296 but this inquiry
is not as important as how minority communities have been affected by the
law’s implementation.297 The effects of this law and others like it have
been destructive.298 The harshness of punishments under them has
lessened the credibility of our contemporary criminal justice system.299
In federal court, African American defendants are more likely to face
mandatory minimum sentences than white or Latinx defendants.300 A
study from 2011 shows that while 39.5% of white defendants and 46.3% of
Latinx defendants received “safety valve” relief from mandatory minimum
sentences that year, only 14.4% of African American defendants obtained
it.301

293. See Abigail A. McNelis, Habitually Offending the Constitution: The Cruel and
Unusual Consequences of Habitual Offender Laws and Mandatory Minimums, 28 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 97, 99 (2017) (discussing mandatory minimums emerging from the War
on Drugs).
294. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
“War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 384 (2002)
(“[T]he drug war’s focus on the African American community was neither an accident nor a
conspiracy. Rather, the drug war is simply a prominent example of the central role both race
and the definition of crime play in the maintenance and legitimization of white
supremacy.”).
295. See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J.,
concurring); see also Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison
Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 757 (1993); Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in
the Criminal Justice System, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 33 (1991) (the “war on drugs” has
resulted in a war against young Black males).
296. See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on
Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination,
15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 23 (2013).
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Note, Redrawing the Line: Retroactive Sentence
Reductions, Mass Incarceration, and the Battle Between Justice and Finality, 54 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 318 (2019) (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
159 (2011)).
301. See id. (citing Patti B. Saris, Sentencing Reform, 59 BOS. BAR J. xli, xlii (2015)).
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One provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986302 was the “100-1”
rule, so named because it required a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence for trafficking in 500 grams of powder cocaine or five grams of
crack.303 This provision of the law had a disproportional impact on African
Americans.304 In Fiscal Year 2016, over three-quarters of crack cocaine
trafficking offenders were Black (82.6%), followed by Latinxs (11.3%),
whites (5.6%), and other races (0.5%).305 This led to disproportionately
higher sentences for Black drug defendants.306 The average number of
Blacks sentenced by federal judges for crack cocaine offenses in each year
from 2009 to 2014 approximated the total lynched in the United States
from 1895 to 1968.307
Like other drugs, crack-cocaine sentences depended on quantity,
resulting in minor players in large conspiracies exposed to potentially long
sentences.308 They were also statutorily mandated, so criminal history
makes no difference to sentencing decisions.309 Although the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced this disparity, crack is still punished at an
18-to-1 ratio, and even this change came too late for those convicted and

302. Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207.
303. See U.S. Supreme Court Weights 100-to-1 Disparity in Crack/Powder Cocaine
Sentencing, ACLU (Oct. 2, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/us-supreme-courtweighs-100-1-disparity-crackpowder-cocaine-sentencing [https://perma.cc/U5GP-4WRW].
304. See Quick Facts on Crack Cocaine Trafficking Offenses, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
(2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/C
rack_Cocaine_FY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM4G-7XQ6]. Some argued that high
mandatory minimum sentences for crack were attributable to racism. See, e.g., Randall
Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 Hᴀʀᴠ. L.
Rᴇᴠ. 1255, 1268–69 (1994) (arguing that because “[B]lacks as a class are disproportionately
victimized” by traffic in crack cocaine, “[B]lacks as a class may be helped by measures
reasonably thought to discourage such conduct”); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1995) (“[C]rack cocaine penalties are the
product of unconscious racism.”).
305. See Quick Facts on Crack Cocaine Trafficking Offenses, supra note 304.
306. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing; No End to Disparity,
28 Aᴍ. Cʀɪᴍ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 161, 205–06 (1991) (finding higher sentences for Black offenders was
caused in part by the 100-to-1 crack and powder cocaine ratio).
307. See Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass
Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66
RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 876 (2014) (first citing Quick Facts on Crack Cocaine Trafficking
Offenses, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Crack_Cocaine.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J76-7EP
W]; then citing Lynchings: By State and Race, 1882–1968, UNIV. MO.-KAN. CITY SCH. L.,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/lynchingsstate.html [https://perma.cc/K
XU6-D3LE] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022)).
308. See Smita Ghosh, Congressional Administration During the Crack Wars: A Study of
the Sentencing Commission, 23 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 119, 139 (2020).
309. See id.
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sentenced under the 100-to-1 ratio.310
Many Black and minority
defendants served unduly long and disproportionate sentences compared to
whites.311
ii. Race and the Sentencing Guidelines
The application of the federal sentencing guidelines in 1987 led to a
radical shift in the racial balance of those sentenced for a crime. Before the
guidelines, whites comprised 66.3% of those sentenced, African Americans
22.3%, and Latinxs 8.5%.312 After the guidelines took effect, the
percentage of whites sentenced dropped to 44.5%, while AfricanAmericans and Latinxs increased to 26.2% and 26.3%, respectively. 313 The
figures are more alarming for those aged 18 to 25: white males sentenced in
this group dropped from 56% immediately before the implementation of
the guidelines to 39.2% after; African Americans increased from 27.6% to
29.2%; and Latinxs sentenced more than doubled, from 12.4% before to
31.6% after guideline implementation.314
The sentencing guidelines also contributed to the increase in the
incarceration rate in the United States.315 They have tripled the length of
prison terms and resulted in the wildly disproportionate imprisonment of
African Americans.316 African Americans make up a large share of the
prison population and face racial disparities in federal sentencing under the
guidelines.317 For example, compared to whites, African American males
are more likely to be incarcerated, receive longer sentences, and have
higher rates of obtaining a no-prison option when it is available.318

310. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.); see also Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 453 n.302 (2017).
311. See Heaney, supra note 306, at 205–06 (stating the 100-to-1 ratio between crack and
powder cocaine disproportionately caused higher sentences for Black offenders).
312. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement
of Minority Voters, 48 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 727, 766 (1998) (citing Heaney, supra note
306, at 204, 204 tbl.5).
313. See id.
314. See Heaney, supra note 306, at 205 tbl.6.
315. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 523 (2007).
316. See id. at 523–24 (citing MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 124 (1999)) (stating
that in 1989 nearly one in four Black males between ages 20 and 29 were under some form
of criminal justice supervision on any given day and in 1995 the figure increased to one in
three).
317. See TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENT’G PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4, 7 (Marc Mauer ed., 2005) (“Blacks are more likely to be
disadvantaged in terms of sentence length at the federal level . . . .”).
318. See id. at 2.
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A summary of 85 empirical studies of sentencing disparity concludes
that African Americans and Latinxs were generally sentenced more harshly
than whites.319 This summary included sentencing data before and after
applying the guidelines and incorporated some state data.320 It notes that
although sentencing guidelines “were associated with smaller unwarranted
sentencing disparities,” those disparities still existed.321 The report found
that: (1) young Black and Latinx males face harsher sentencing compared
to other populations; (2) Black defendants convicted of harming white
victims receive harsher sentences than defendants convicted of an
intraracial crime; and (3) Blacks and Latinxs convicted of drug and
property crimes face more time in prison.322
The landmark Supreme Court decision that made the guidelines
advisory, United States v. Booker, did not alter racial disparities at
sentencing.323 In 2006, the year after the Court decided Booker, 23% of
federal inmates incarcerated for drug offenses were African American,
while only 15% were Caucasian.324 Booker did not solve the problem of
sentencing racial disparity.325 Judges who follow Booker and impose
sentences that deviate from the guidelines still implicitly sentence African
Americans more severely compared to whites.326
American Indians have also been negatively affected by guideline
sentencing. The United States Sentencing Commission created a Native
American Advisory Group in 2002 to understand racism and disparate
effects on American Indians in federal sentencing.327 The group found
disparities: American Indians serve longer sentences in federal custody

319. See OJMARRH MITCHELL & DORIS L. MACKENZIE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SENTENCING OUTCOMES: A META-ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING
RESEARCH 8–9 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208129.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6K3K-JPK2].
320. See id. at 7.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 20–21, 74.
323. See Jennifer M. Cox, Frequent Arrests, Harsh Sentencing, and the Disproportionate
Impact They Have on African Americans and Their Community, 3 S. REGION BLACK L.
STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 17, 25 (2009) (discussing the disproportionate and extreme negative
impact of harsh Sentencing Guidelines on African Americans and their communities).
324. See id. at 25–26 (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BULLETIN:
PRISONERS IN 2006 25 (2007)).
325. See id. at 25.
326. See id. at 26.
327. See Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Convictions and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal Sentencing, 46 U.S.F.
L. REV. 37, 73–74 (2011) (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY
GROUP ON NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING ISSUES 10–11 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/
Research/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/20031104_Native_American_Advisory_Group_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K3S-PN8Q]).
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under the guidelines.328 Specifically, American Indians prosecuted for
crimes under the Major Crimes Act face longer imprisonment compared to
whites who commit similar crimes in the same areas but do not face federal
prosecution.329
iii. Fast-Track Programs Disproportionately Affect Latinxs
Fast-track programs are rooted in aversion towards foreigners from
developing nations.330 Fast-track’s advent coincides with the sharp
increase in criminal prosecutions of migrants under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and
1326.331 It also coincides with Operation Gatekeeper, a plan to militarize
the U.S.-Mexico border that led to more migrant deaths in the desert and
failed deterrence to decrease migration from Mexico and Central
America.332
Fast-track programs impact Latinxs more than other racial or ethnic
groups due to their prevalence in border districts with higher caseloads.333
Federal prosecutors have focused time and resources on the prosecution of
criminal immigration violations such as illegal entry and re-entry from drug
enforcement.334 Due to skyrocketing numbers of people with prior removal
328. See id. at 74.
329. See Gregory D. Smith, Note, Disparate Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
on Indians in Indian Country: Why Congress Should Run the Erie Railroad into the Major
Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 483, 486–87 (2004).
330. See Nicole Newman, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 437,
440 (2008) (noting that impassioned Americans focus efforts on proposed legislation
supporting not only the construction of a U.S.-Mexico border fence but also the
criminalization of unlawful presence).
331. Illegal entry prosecutions increased from 15,392 cases in Fiscal Year 1997 to 90,067
in 2013, a 500% increase. See The Immigration Prosecution Factory, KINO BORDER
INITIATIVE (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.kinoborderinitiative.org/immigration-prosecutionfactory/ [https://perma.cc/79JV-SEK7]. The total number of people apprehended for
illegally crossing the Southern United States border has been steadily falling since the year
2000. See Rebecca Hersher & Vanessa Qian, 3 Charts that Show What’s Actually
Happening Along the Southern Border, NPR (June 22, 2018, 5:15 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/22/622246815/unauthorized-immigration-in-three-graphs
[https://perma.cc/Q8TE-2AK3].
332. See Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New
Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 279 (2018) (“The Clinton
Administration implemented Operation Gatekeeper in 1994 as a method to stop the flow of
undocumented migration across the southern border.”). The first fast-track program began in
1993. See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1995).
333. See Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d at 761 (“The fast-track policy undoubtedly affects
Hispanics more than other races, because the Southern District of California includes a
portion of the United States/Mexico border.”).
334. See Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability,
Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 728 (2016) (citing
Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal
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orders, the government now prosecutes many caught reentering the United
States for illegal re-entry. For example, in 2006, “almost 26% of all federal
prosecutions were related to illegal reentry and other types of immigration
violations.”335 That number rose to 49.9% by 2012.336 In 2016,
criminalization of immigration violations such as unlawful entry comprised
52% of all federal prosecutions.337 In fiscal year 2017, there were 300,000
apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border.338 Without question, fasttrack programs have had a negative, disproportionate impact on Latinxs.
The historical exploitation of people of color helped justify the plea
bargaining machine. Violent, conscious racism led to implicit racial biases
present in today’s criminal justice system that facilitate the machine’s
operation.
IV. FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE PLEA
BARGAINING MACHINE
The plea bargaining machine altered federal public defender (FPD)
practice. This Part provides a brief history of the FPD program and
contrasts it with state and county systems. It then describes federal public
defending before the sentencing guidelines. Despite fewer trials, federal
defenders today positively influence outcomes for clients who plead guilty
under fast-track programs.
A. Brief History of the Federal Public Defender Program
Although the right to appointed counsel in capital cases came in 1932,339
the federal defender program did not arrive until 1970.340 Several events

Immigration Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RCSH. CTR. (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/
[https://perma.cc/69BR-VCC9]).
335. See id.
336. See id. (first citing MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 248470, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012 4 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7TSD-QEAE]; then citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 1
(2015),
http://ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projectsand-surveys/immigration/2015_Illegal-Reentry-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UUV-JNHF]).
337. See TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION NOW 52
PERCENT OF ALL FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
crim/446/ [https://perma.cc/DRS2-6TD3].
338. See Sean McMinn & Renee Klahr, Where Does Illegal Immigration Mostly Occur?
Here’s What The Data Tell Us, NPR (Jan. 10, 2019, 4:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2019/01/10/683662691/where-does-illegal-immigration-mostly-occur-heres-what-the-datatell-us [https://perma.cc/6LMK-924D].
339. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
340. See Defender Services, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/de
fender-services [https://perma.cc/JN2N-BMXQ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
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took place to form the program during this period. The Judicial Conference
of the United States first proposed creating a federal defender in 1937,341
but Congress failed to pass the bill in 1939.342 In 1938, the Supreme Court
of the United States ruled that federal defendants have a right to appointed
counsel in felony trials.343 Twenty-three years later, in 1961, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy’s Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Justice published the Allen Report, which proposed a
professional federal defender program.344 The Allen Report became the
centerpiece for the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA),345 but “[this] final
law only instituted a system to recompense appointed counsel.”346
The DOJ and the Judicial Conference’s Committee to Implement the
CJA commissioned the Oaks Report, a study that in 1967 proposed
improvements to the CJA.347 This report concluded that large urban
districts had difficulty meeting the need for experienced lawyers from lists
of panel members.348 It recommended supplying those districts with fulltime, salaried defenders.349 This recommendation led to the 1970
amendment to the CJA, which authorized the formation of defender
organizations in districts in which “at least two hundred persons annually
require the services of appointed counsel.”350 The change called for federal
public defender organizations (FPDOs) and community defender
organizations (CDOs).351 FPDOs are federal employees governed by the
U.S. District Court, and CDOs constitute nonprofit defense counsel service
organizations, staffed by non-federal government employees and governed
by a board of directors.352

341. See Paul D. Hazlehurst, A Federal Public Defender’s Perspective, FED. LAW., Mar.
2015, at 50, 52 (citing John J. Haugh, The Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964: Catalyst in
the Continuing Foundation of the Rights of the Criminal Defendant, 41 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 996, 997 (1966)).
342. See id.; see also Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
343. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938).
344. See Hazlehurst, supra note 341, at 52.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for
Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 347 (2017) (citing DALLIN H. OAKS, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1969)).
348. See Hazlehurst, supra note 341, at 52 (citing Dallin H. Oaks, Improving the
Criminal Justice Act, 55 ABA J. 217, 221 (1969)).
349. See id.
350. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(1)).
351. See id.
352. See Jona Goldschmidt & Don Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se
Defense, 1996–2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 81, 92 n.49 (2015) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(1), (2)).
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In 1976, there were 22 FPDOs and nine CDOs.353 In 1995, there were
48 FPDOs in 58 federal districts and 11 CDOs in 13 districts.354 FPDOs
represented approximately one half of 89,000 indigent defendants.355 CJA
panel lawyers represented the other half.356 Today, there are 81 federal
defender organizations that employ over 3,700 lawyers, investigators,
paralegals, and support staff.357 Nationally, these organizations represent
approximately 60% of indigent defendants.358 CJA panel appointments
represent the remaining 40%.359 These statistics illustrate the percentages
of federal public defender representation and provide the reader with a
context to understand how many defendants are affected by AFPD work.
B. Differences Between Federal360 and Local361 Defender Systems
Although there are many variations between districts and offices in
federal and state systems, several important characteristics differentiate the
two. For example, unlike many state systems, federal public defender
programs are well-funded362 and provide clients with good
representation.363 Some describe the federal public defender the “gold
353. See Hazlehurst, supra note 341, at 52 (citing Dudley B. Bonsai, The Criminal
Justice Act, 1964 to 1976, 52 IND. L.J. 135, 136 n.9 (1976)).
354. See id. (citing John J. Cleary, Federal Defender Services, Serving the System or the
Client, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 68 (1995)).
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See Defender Services, supra note 340.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. To understand the size of the federal criminal justice system compared to states,
federal prison inmates account for only 13% of the total prison population in the United
States. See Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J.
LEGAL STUD. 187, 192 (2013).
361. In 2007, there were at least 1,046 public defender offices. This does not include
FPDOs, offices that provided primarily contract or assigned counsel services with private
attorneys, or public defender offices that were principally funded by a tribal government.
Offices that provided primarily appellate or juvenile services were excluded from the data
collection. See Inter-Univ. Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Rsch., Bureau of Just. Stat., Census
of Public Defender Offices: County-Based and Local Offices, 2007 (ICPSR 29502), NACJD
(May 13, 2011), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/29502/document
ation [https://perma.cc/MM4M-6K8N].
362. See Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 197
(2021) (“[S]tate defenders’ caseloads are often significantly higher than their federal
counterparts, which may mean that in the federal system, there is less ineffective assistance
of counsel.” (citing Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent
Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 857–66 (1997) (comparing the caseloads and
institutional resources available to state versus federal public defenders))).
363. See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This
Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 685 n.11 (2010); see also Wesley M. Oliver, Choice
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standard” of indigent defense representation.364 Federal defenders are paid
higher salaries365 and, with few exceptions, have lower caseloads compared
to state or county defenders.366
Federal cases are more serious because the vast majority of federal
crimes are felonies.367 Further, federal prosecutors, except those handling
fast-track programs like flip-flops368 and Operation Streamline (OSL),369
rarely charge or plea bargain offenses to misdemeanors.370 Federal
defendants charged with felonies serve more time in prison compared to
state defendants because sentences of probation are rare in the federal
system.371 Finally, federal practice involves crimes that cross state and

of Counsel and the Appearance of Equal Justice Under Law, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
1117, 1126 (2014) (citing Zachary Cloud, Note, The Problem of Low Crime:
Constitutionally Inadequate Criminal Defense in Rural America, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403,
420 (2013)).
364. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1099, 1127 (2014) (citing Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of
the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 325–26 (2011)) (noting that in
one recent survey federal judges rated the performance of federal public defenders slightly
better than that of their prosecutorial counterparts).
365. I worked in as a Pima County Assistant Public Defender for ten years. When hired
by the federal public defender in 2015, my annual salary increased by 25%. As of the
writing of this Article my salary is higher than the vast majority of lawyers working in the
Pima County indigent defense system.
366. See Julian A. Cook III, Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule 11
Process, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1073, 1115 (2019) (“Though public defender caseloads are
comparatively more burdensome at the state level, many federal public defender offices
experience similar hardships.” (first citing Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining
from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1055, 1075–76 (2016)); then citing Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095
(2016))); see also Norman Lefstein, Time to Update the ‘ABA Ten Principles’ for the 21st
Century, CHAMPION, Mar. 2016, at 44 (noting that the problem of overwhelming caseloads
is one that afflicts state public defense systems but not federal public defenders).
367. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 258
(2015) (noting that federal misdemeanors are “few in number”).
368. Lawyers in federal court in Arizona also refer to flip flops as “mixed complaints.” In
a flip-flop, the government charges a defendant with a felony and a misdemeanor. If he/she
rejects the plea, the government prosecutes the misdemeanor. If the defendant pleads guilty
to the misdemeanor, the government dismisses felony, and the magistrate judge sentences
the defendant without a presentence report either at the initial appearance or the
detention/change of plea/sentencing hearing. See David Martin & James F. Metcalf, Pretrial
Services Along the Border: A District of Arizona Perspective, 76 FED. PROBATION (2012).
369. See Keller, supra note 189, at 121 (explaining that OSL is an early disposition
program designed to quickly process as many illegal entrants and re-entrants as possible).
370. See Natapoff, supra note 367, at 292 (“Federal misdemeanors are relatively few in
number, but — with the notable exception of immigration cases — they tend to get
appointed counsel and individuated adversarial treatment.”).
371. See Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the Sword of
Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to Federal Law, 21
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 244, 258 n.79 (2016) (“Probation sentences are relatively rare
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national borders, such as drug importation, sex trafficking, immigration,
and extraditions.372 The federal government also has authority to charge
crimes committed in Indian Country because of the Major Crimes Act.373
State practice consists mostly of crimes within one jurisdiction and
includes mixtures of misdemeanors and felonies.374 State and county
offices typically have misdemeanor and felony units in which lawyers
exclusively handle one caseload type.375 State units also include appeals
and juvenile units.376 Units in federal offices are based on appellate versus
trial lawyers.377 Some federal offices also have capital habeas units
(CHUs) that exclusively handle death penalty appeals.378

in the federal system, mainly because the government tends to prosecute only more serious
crimes that generally warrant incarceration.”).
372. State criminal authority requires only that criminal conduct take place within the
state’s territorial limits. See WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 14 (15th ed., 1993). Federal
criminal authority usually requires the involvement of a federal interest. Some bases for
federal jurisdiction include (1) property belonging to the United States; (2) assaulting or
killing specified federal officers or employees while engaged in performing their official
duties; (3) protection of foreign officials or official guests; (4) use of the mails; and (5)
stamp forgery. See 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 19:4 (16th ed., 2021). The commission
of an offense within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is
also a common basis. See 18 U.S.C. § 7. Some federal authority is designed to supplement
and assist local authorities in tasks of law enforcement, such as crimes that rest on interstate
travel or transportation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 1952.
373. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (creating federal authority over serious crimes when committed by
American Indians).
374. See
Federal
Versus
State
Work,
UNIV.
MICH.
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.umich.edu/mdefenders/students/Different-Types-of-IndigentDefense/Pages/Federal-versus-State-Work.aspx [https://perma.cc/26JS-7AHB] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2022) (“State defenders will handle everything from public urination to petty theft
to serious homicide cases over the course of their careers. There will be public order
offenses, theft offenses, drug offenses, weapon offenses, and violent offenses in state
systems. There is a lot of variety in state systems.”).
375. See Richard A. Chappell, Looking Back at Federal Probation, 66 FED. PROBATION
3, 9 (2002) (“Only a small percentage of juvenile offenders appears before federal courts but
the number of cases against juveniles are considerable.”).
376. See Gabriel J. Chin & Hannah Bogen, Warren Court Incrementalism and Indigent
Criminal Appellants’ Right to Trial Transcripts, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 667, 689 (2020) (noting
that the “vast majority of states now have appeals specialists as part of their indigent defense
program, whether as appellate units in general public defenders offices, freestanding
appellate public defenders, separate trial and appeals panels for appointed private counsel,
or some combination”).
377. Most federal defender offices have a traditional trial unit (TRAD) which includes
appeals unit and a capital habeas unit (CHU).
378. In total, there are 17 CHU units among 91 federal public defender offices. See
Stephen B. Bright, Independence of Counsel: An Essential Requirement for Competent
Counsel and A Working Adversary System, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 853, 881 (2018).
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Federal charges depend on USAO policies that vary among districts.379
The most prevalent charges along the southwest border include
immigration crimes such as illegal entry and re-entry,380 drug importation,
alien smuggling,381 bulk cash smuggling,382 and firearm smuggling.383
AFPDs along the southwest also handle cases from Indian reservations and
charges common to most districts, such as unlawful possession of a
firearm, wire fraud, and bank robbery.384
C. The Plea Bargaining Machine’s Impact on Federal
Public Defender Practice
i. Federal Defense Practice in Tucson Before the Sentencing Guidelines
The purpose of federal public defenders, to provide high-quality
representation to the indigent accused facing federal charges,385 has not
changed, but the practice has. Federal defenders used to be in trial more
often compared to today.386 Beginning in 1970, when the federal public
defender program started in Arizona, AFPDs were in trial about once a
month.387 The caseload for AFPDs was about 50 cases per lawyer.388 Trial
lawyers handled their own appeals and traveled to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to argue cases.389 The caseload consisted of drug-related crimes

379. See BRIAN D. JOHNSON, THE MISSING LINK: EXAMINING PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING
ACROSS
FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURTS
109
(2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/245351.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD9J-K66K]
(finding significant variation in charging decisions across federal districts — disparate
outcomes are the result of different charging strategies based on each district’s prosecutorial
goals and caseloads); see also TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S.
PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE CRIME VARIES WIDELY BY LOCATION, PROGRAM AND AGENCY
(2016), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/411/ [https://perma.cc/G3UH-GLYG].
380. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 makes it a crime to unlawfully enter the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1326 makes it a crime to unlawfully reenter, attempt to unlawfully reenter, or to be found in
the United States after having been deported, ordered removed, or denied admission.
381. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 makes it illegal to aid, sell, encourage, or induce illegal entry of an
undocumented person into the United States.
382. See 31 U.S.C. § 5332.
383. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.
384. See id. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes the shipping, transportation, or possession of any
firearm or ammunition distributed in interstate or foreign commerce by a convicted felon.
385. See Bonnie Hoffman, Gideon’s Champions, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (May
2013), https://www.nacdl.org/Article/May2013-GideonsChampions [https://perma.cc/BS7D
-Q3PR].
386. See Ortman, supra note 1 (stating that the federal trial rate accounted for 14% of
convictions in 1990 and 5% in 2002. The plea rate in 1938 was 80% and 86% in 1940).
387. See Interview with Fredric Kay, supra note 5.
388. See id.
389. See id. Mr. Kay also stated that his caseload at the Pima County Public Defender,
where he practiced for just under two years, was double, with about 100 cases. See id.
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as well as crimes committed on American Indian Reservations such as
sexual assaults, aggravated assaults, and homicides.390 The USAO charged
only a few illegal re-entry cases per year.391
There were no guidelines, so sentencing was “wide open.”392 Judges
imposed sentences of varying length depending on the case and
defendant.393 Cases would also go to trial quicker compared to today.394
Trials, with some exceptions, would take place within three months of
arrest.395 Today, the average federal criminal trial can take months,
sometimes years, to reach a jury.396 Fortunately, Assistant United States
Attorneys (AUSAs) promptly sent disclosure to AFPDs and continued to
send it as it became available before trial.397 Unlike today, agents did not
audio- or video-record interviews. The DEA and FBI assigned one agent to
author reports who adopted the reports of others.398 A higher percentage of
clients were in custody during the 1970s compared to today.399
ii. Contemporary Federal Public Defender Practice in Tucson
Today, unlike pre-sentencing guideline practice, federal public defenders
have few opportunities to cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and
argue before juries.400 Newly hired AFPDs with little to no trial experience

390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See Christopher Slobogin, The Case for A Federal Criminal Court System (and
Sentencing Reform), 108 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 946 (2020) (noting that in federal court “the
median time from initiation of a traditional criminal case to its termination at the district
court level has skyrocketed by more than 200 percent in the past forty-five years, from
around three months to over seven months”).
395. See Interview with Frederic Kay, supra note 5.
396. See Felony Offenses,
OFF. FED. PUB. DEF. FOR N.D. CAL.,
https://www.ndcalfpd.org/felony-offense [https://perma.cc/3J6X-9GQE] (last visited Nov.
24, 2011) (“Most felony cases, however, take much longer. The average felony case in the
Northern District takes one year from the arraignment to sentencing. Complicated
conspiracy cases or fraud cases can often take much longer. Delays can come from the need
to review discovery, interview witnesses, bring and argue motions, negotiate plea
agreements, and prepare for trial.”).
397. See Email from Frederic Kay, Former Fed. Pub. Def. for the Dist. of Arizona (1984
to 2004), to author (Sept. 24, 2021) (on file with author).
398. See id.
399. See Interview with Frederic Kay, supra note 5.
400. See Patton, supra note 26, at 2581 (noting that in 1963, nearly 15% of all federal
defendants went to trial; in 2010, the figure was 2.7%); see also Benjamin Weiser, Trial by
Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-servedbehind-closed-doors.html [https://perma.cc/T7FQ-CPDL].
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have a tough time getting this experience because there are not enough
trials to go around.401
The best opportunity for new lawyers to attain cross-examination
practice are in evidentiary motion hearings. Evidentiary motion hearings
also allow for direct examination and oral argument before judges.402
Examinations of witnesses sometimes take place at sentencing, but busy
judges mostly deny such requests by defense lawyers.403 Judges, in this
Author’s experience, do not want to hear mitigation evidence directly from
witnesses in routine cases because of crowded calendars.
Another opportunity to cross-examine government witnesses and present
evidence is preliminary hearings.404 But today, at least in Tucson, the vast
majority of defense lawyers waive this right on behalf of clients.405 To
indict, prosecutors instead take cases to the grand jury.406 A few
prosecutors who have no choice but to take a case to preliminary hearing
retaliate by not offering a disclosure agreement.407 As of the writing of this

401. Supervisors in the Tucson office of the Federal Public Defender in Arizona have had
a tough time getting newly hired AFPDs to join a case going to trial because of the lack of
trials. The COVID-19 pandemic has not helped.
402. FED. R. EVID. 611 (defining the scope of direct and cross examinations); see also
Goodwyn v. Simons, 90 F. App’x 680, 682 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curium) (applying Rule
611(a)'s standard to evidentiary hearings).
403. There is no constitutional right nor rule requiring judges to permit testimony of
defense witnesses at sentencing. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§26.4(g) (4th ed. 2020) (“[E]videntiary hearings are common, but not required, for federal
sentencing. Federal Rule 32(i) provides for a sentencing hearing at which the court ‘may
permit the parties to introduce evidence on objections’ to the presentence report.” (quoting
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i))); Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1846 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has similarly left unclear whether the defendant’s
due process and/or compulsory process rights provide any constitutionally protected interest
in rebutting the state’s evidence or calling witnesses in a noncapital sentencing proceeding.”
(citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 218 (1971))). Victims in federal cases,
however, have the right to be present at sentencing. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771).
404. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that cross-examination
of accuser at preliminary hearing was sufficient to meet constitutional requirements).
405. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3060(a). The term “preliminary
hearing” refers to the proceeding formerly called a “preliminary examination,” described in
Rule 5.1(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a).
406. A preliminary hearing must be held within 14 days for in-custody defendants and 21
days for those out of custody. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. Prosecutors often elect to take the
case to a grand jury before the preliminary hearing. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic
Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J.
1265, 1282 (2006) (pointing out that federal prosecutors “routinely time grand jury
indictments so as to bypass the adversary preliminary hearing, even though some courts
have frowned upon this practice” (citations omitted)).
407. The Tucson office of the Federal Public Defender negotiated a disclosure agreement
with the USAO. If the defendant insists on a preliminary hearing the prosecutor does not
offer the disclosure agreement.
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Article, most AFPDs in Tucson sign such agreements because they require
prosecutors to provide disclosure promptly instead of on the eve of trial or
during trial after a witness testifies. These disclosures during trial are legal
under the Jencks Act.408
AFPDs who seldom or never file motions that require evidentiary
hearings, insist on preliminary hearings, or go to trial, will never attain the
experience level required to provide adequate advice for clients.409 It is
difficult to know what will happen if a client rejects a plea agreement if the
lawyer has not been in trial for years.410 Having a comfortable presence in
front of a jury, being quick on one’s feet to make objections, and the
competence to modify a defense theory during trial — these are abilities
honed only by confronting witnesses before judges and juries.411
Contemporary federal criminal practice in Tucson has opened criticism
of federal public defenders. State practitioners say federal defenders never
go to trial and mostly represent illegal re-entry cases. For state lawyers,
federal practice is more lucrative but boring.412 Lawyers “plead everyone
out” and “never fight cases.”413 While there are fewer trials in federal
court414 and many cases are immigration related, the “boring” criticism is
unfounded. While Tucson AFPDs handle a fair number of drug cases, they
also handle complex white collar and violent American Indian reservation

408. The Jencks Act, which controls pre-trial discovery, does not require the disclosure of
reports by government witnesses until after the officer testifies on direct examination at trial
or a pre-trial hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. In reality, if the government insists on the terms
of the Jencks Act, trial judges urge them to disclose reports a reasonable period before trial
to avoid delay during trial.
409. It is generally known that younger lawyers need to learn from more experienced
practitioners. See, e.g., Willie Peacock, Advice for New Lawyers: How to Survive and
Thrive, CLIO BLOG (July 20, 2021), https://www.clio.com/blog/advice-for-new-lawyers/
[https://perma.cc/YK98-J9SR] (advising younger lawyers that their clients are likely to get
better results if they find an experienced mentor with decades of experience).
410. See Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher John Bodnar, Honesty Is the Best
Policy: It’s Time to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155,
158, 200 (2010) (stating a civil lawyer’s failure to disclose his or her lack of trial experience
to a prospective client may be a misrepresentation). This applies to the criminal defense
lawyer as well.
411. See Ruth A. Bahe-Jachna, Finding Your Way to First-Chairing a Trial, 44 LITIG. 18,
21 (2017) (stating the best way to hone trial skills is to practice before a jury and judge —
for young lawyers this can be accomplished through mock trials).
412. This is based on this Author’s experiences talking with county and state public
defenders in Pima County.
413. Id.
414. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004)
(explaining that the number of trials “[o]ver the past generation or more” has “undergone a
sharp decline”).
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prosecutions charged under the Major Crimes Act.415 Supervisory AFPDs
decide what cases to panel to CJA lawyers and, absent a conflict of interest,
intentionally keep more interesting cases in-house.416
Today’s practice of few trials means few acquittals. This leads AFPDs
to celebrate other types of victories. Celebratory emails are mostly about
judges imposing time-served sentences in drug sentencings or favorable
outcomes from pre-trial motions.417 This Author’s “victories” in federal
cases include plea agreements to time served because prosecutors
sometimes agree on the strength of pre-trial motions to suppress evidence
or dismiss charges. Another type of victory includes dismissed charges
when Immigration and Customs Enforcement violates the Bail Reform Act
by incarcerating clients without papers who magistrate judges release from
pre-trial detention.418
D. Federal Public Defenders and Fast-Track Cases at the
U.S-Mexico Border
OSL and flip-flop cases assumed approximately 10% of this Author’s
time as AFPD before the USAO suspended the programs due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.419 As of the writing of this Article, OSL is
suspended.420 Flip-flops returned, but in a varied format: the turnaround
time is approximately 30 days between arrest and the sentencing hearing.
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the turnaround time was one week.421
Most supervisors speculate flip-flops will return to the shorter timeframe
when the COVID-19 pandemic subsides.422

415. This information is not publicly available but is based on this Author’s experience as
supervisory AFPD.
416. With rare exception, the Federal Public Defender in Tucson panels most illegal reentry and alien smuggling cases and keeps the majority of violent and white-collar cases.
417. In the Pima County Public Defender’s Office, where this Author practiced from
2005 to 2015, celebratory emails about trials were a frequent occurrence.
418. See United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he risk
of nonappearance referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 must involve an element of volition.”
(citing United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1176–78 (D. Or. 2012))).
419. As of the writing of this Article, OSL in Tucson is suspended and flip-flops resumed
after an absence of one and a half years.
420. Email from Jon M. Sands, Fed. Pub. Def., Arizona, to author (July 9, 2021) (on file
with author).
421. See Mona Lynch, Backpacking the Border: The Intersection of Drug and
Immigration Prosecutions in a High Volume U.S. Court, 57 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 112, 120
(2015) (“The subsequent hearing for those heading to flip-flop court will happen within a
week, by which time the defendant will have spoken to an attorney and been informed of the
offer in exchange for pleading guilty.”).
422. The current general order from the District Court of Arizona forbids the presence of
in-custody defendants in court absent trial or other compelling circumstance. Once the Court
lifts the order flip-flops will return to the normal format and schedule.
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Work for OSL and flip-flop cases includes explaining complaints, plea
bargains, and providing legal advice to clients about pleading guilty. As
most people charged under these programs are foreign-born, they require a
layperson’s explanation of the U.S. justice system.423 AFPDs also explain
to clients the panoply of constitutional rights424 and help them complete
forms for the nonprofit group No More Deaths425 to assist with recovering
property seized by U.S. Border Patrol agents.426 After the first meeting,
AFPDs call clients’ family members to explain the legal process and
sentence.
Our impact on cases sometimes includes convincing prosecutors to
lower the number of days in an OSL or flip-flop plea agreement if we
detect mistakes in sentencing calculations. Prosecutors determine the
sentence on these early disposition plea agreements from the number and
timing of a client’s removals, criminal history, and, for alien smuggling
cases, the number of undocumented people in a car.427 As an example, if
the defense lawyer suspects an incorrect number of days for sentencing
based on the client’s criminal history and number of removals and the
AUSA agrees, a sentence could be lowered from 120 to 90 days.
During OSL proceedings, defense lawyers often convince prosecutors to
dismiss cases if clients show symptoms of mental illness or
incompetency.428 OSL clients who do not speak English or Spanish and
had no crossing history also see their cases dismissed because of the
unavailability of indigenous language interpreters for same-day court
hearings.429 If an OSL client has a family member in the same OSL group,

423. See Lynch, supra note 421, at 118 (noting that flip-flop cases “include[] illegal
entry/re-entry cases, drug cases and a smattering of illegal identity cases that typically
involve a defendant accused of using fraudulent documents at the port of entry on the
border”). Operation Streamline is “limited to those accused of illegally entering or reentering the United States.” See id. at 118 n.4.
424. This includes the rights to trial, an attorney, privilege against self-incrimination,
among others. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
425. No More Deaths/No Mas Muertes is a humanitarian organization formed in 2004
dedicated to “stepping up efforts to stop the deaths of migrants in the desert and to achieving
the enactment of a set of Faith-Based Principles for Immigration Reform.” See About No
More Deaths, NO MORE DEATHS, https://nomoredeaths.org/about-no-more-deaths/
[https://perma.cc/M6SS-RRGY] (last visited Dec. 12, 2021). It became affiliated with the
Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson as an official church ministry in the summer of
2008. See id.
426. See id. (“We minister to incarcerated migrants and their families by helping them
recover their personal effects from the US Border Patrol, belongings that would otherwise
be lost. We pick them up, safeguard them, and mail them home.”).
427. This is based on this Author’s experience representing clients at OSL from 2015 to
2020.
428. See id.
429. See id.
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lawyers ask judges to order detention facilities to house them together.430
If a client in OSL expresses a fear of returning to Mexico or his or her
native country because of threats from gangs or cartels, lawyers request the
United States Marshals to permit them to take a form letter requesting
asylum or refugee protection to the detention facility, so he or she gains
placement in an asylum track in immigration court.431
Lawyers sometimes convince judges to release clients charged under the
flip-flop program at the initial appearance. As flip-flop plea agreements
require time in custody, lawyers occasionally persuade prosecutors to
permit clients to self-surrender at a later time because of work or school
obligations. Defendants charged under the flip-flop program who
magistrate judges release at the initial appearance sometimes reject
misdemeanor plea agreements because of required incarceration.432 These
clients instead wait for indictment and felony pleas.433 District court judges
in these cases frequently impose time-served sentences because of the low
guideline ranges for these charges and clients’ minimal criminal history.434
Federal public defense in 2022 consists of fewer trials compared to the
pre-guideline era. In Arizona, the fast-track program in illegal re-entry
cases created a system of massive plea bargaining.435 In these quick
resolution cases, AFPDs spend most of their time on non-litigation type
efforts such as explaining plea agreements, advising clients to waive trial
rights, and calling family members.436

430. See id.
431. The intent of the form letter, drafted by the lawyer, is to alert prison and
immigration officials that the accused wants to appear before an immigration judge in order
to begin an asylum or refugee application program so as to avoid return to his/her home
country and face death. See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-andasylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/S3D5-UMTT].
432. This is based on this Author’s professional experience as AFPD representing clients
in flip-flop proceedings from 2015 to 2022.
433. See supra note 432.
434. To qualify for flip-flop charging a person must have minimal criminal history and be
accused of charges encompassed by the program: illegal entry, presentation of false
documents, or drug possession. See Lynch, supra note 421, at 118.
435. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 147 (2009).
436. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351
n.405 (2010) (quoting interview with defense attorney in OSL describing role as “‘not really
practicing law’ but rather ‘sort of like doing administrative detail’”).
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V. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
This Part explains efforts to abolish mandatory minimum sentencing
laws.437 It then advises FPDO supervisors and line AFPDs on how to deal
with the reality of the plea bargaining machine. FPDOs can maximize the
number of cases that should go to trial by offering better training.
Indirectly, FPDOs can promote deep work for lawyers and staff to increase
productivity and work satisfaction. In the right cases, they can encourage
AFPDs to discuss matters with trusted journalists to increase public
awareness of the perils of mandatory minimums.
A. Efforts to Eliminate Federal Mandatory Minimums
Federal mandatory minimum laws such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
have been in effect for nearly 40 years.438 Ten-year sentences for low-level
drug offenders have inspired people to become vocal about repealing these
laws.439 Retired United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy is
one example. In 1994, he told Congress he agreed with most federal judges
that “mandatory minimums are an imprudent, unwise and often unjust
mechanism for sentencing.”440 In August of 2003, he gave a wellpublicized speech to congressional lawmakers at the American Bar
Association’s Annual Meeting.441 During the speech, he pleaded for
lawmakers to change federal law to not require five or ten years for drug
traffickers but to give judges discretion to impose appropriate sentences.442

437. Judges have expressed deep concern with the sentencing guidelines. See, e.g.,
Influential Judges’ Group Urges Repeal of Tough Sentencing Guidelines, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
24, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-sep-24-na-judges24story.html [https://perma.cc/H678-AZ35]. I have found no organizations dedicated to
repealing the sentencing guidelines nor fast-track programs.
438. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
439. See George Copeland, Jr., Rally Calls for End to Mandatory Minimum Sentences,
RICHMOND FREE PRESS (Apr. 8, 2021, 6:00 PM), http://richmondfreepress.com/news/2021/a
pr/08/rally-calls-end-mandatory-minimum-sentences [https://perma.cc/3PJZ-LCC8].
440. See Mandatory Sentencing Is Criticized by Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 1994),
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/10/us/mandatory-sentencing-is-criticized-by-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/4TX4-2CE4] (quoting testimony of Justice Kennedy).
441. See Brad Wright, Justice Kennedy Criticizes Mandatory Minimum Sentences, CNN
(Apr. 9, 2003, 5:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/04/09/kennedy.congress/index.
html [https://perma.cc/C2KZ-X8RZ].
442. See Michael D. Wysocki, Comment, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: The Effects of
Blakely v. Washington, United States v. Booker, and the Future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 495, 508 (2006) (citing Anthony M. Kennedy, J., U.S.
Sup. Ct., Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html
[https://perma.cc/T5ZL-A6DZ]).
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Justice Kennedy is one of many people who oppose mandatory
minimums. Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) is an
organization that aims to repeal all such laws.443 Part of their work
includes lobbying in Washington, D.C. for the repeal of these statutes.
Julie Stewart, its founder, wrote that she started FAMM to bring attention
to the fact that mandatory sentences are draconian and remove discretion
from judges.444 Judges are closer to defendants compared to members of
Congress who know nothing about drug cases.445
Since its founding in 1991, FAMM has helped enact federal legislation
to reform sentencing and prison policies such as the 1994 safety valve, the
Fair Sentencing Act, and the First Step Act of 2018.446 At the state level,
FAMM has helped repeal mandatory minimums in Michigan,
Massachusetts, Florida, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee,
Georgia, and Iowa.447 The organization has also served as a founding
member of the Clemency Project 2014, one of the biggest pro bono
mobilizations in history; resulting in over 1,700 people receiving
sentencing communications from President Barack Obama; among other
accomplishments.448
Other efforts to eliminate or amend federal mandatory minimum
sentencing have come from Congress. On January 27, 2021, United States
Senators Cory Booker and Dick Durbin announced the Eliminating a
Quantifiably Unjust Application of the Law (EQUAL) Act to eliminate the
eighteen to one crack to powder cocaine disparity.449 On September 28,

443. See Erik S. Siebert, Comment, The Process Is the Problem: Lessons Learned from
United States Drug Sentencing Reform, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 867, 898–900 (2010).
444. See Julie Stewart, The Effects of Mandatory Minimums on Families and Society, 16
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37, 38 (1999) (“In 1991, I started Families Against Mandatory
Minimums (FAMM) and tried to bring attention to the fact that mandatory sentences exist,
that they are draconian in many cases, and that they remove discretion from the judge, who
is, in fact, closest to the defendant. He has been involved. He knows about the plea bargain.
He has read the presentence report. He should be the one doing the sentencing instead of
members of Congress who have never laid eyes on the defendants and know nothing about
their cases.”).
445. Id.
446. See FAMM’s History and Accomplishments, FAMM, https://famm.org/aboutus/famms-history/ [https://perma.cc/BGD9-ULGN] (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
447. See id.
448. See id.
449. See It’s Time to #EndTheDisparity Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, FAMM,
https://famm.org/endthedisparity/ [https://perma.cc/Q89P-EKXC] (last visited Oct. 21,
2021) (“On January 27, Sens. Cory Booker and Dick Durbin announced the EQUAL Act,
which would end this sentencing disparity and apply the equal penalties retroactively. The
EQUAL Act was introduced in the U.S. House on March 9 by the bipartisan group of Reps.
Hakeem Jeffries, Kelly Armstrong, Bobby Scott, and Don Bacon. These bills will be
considered in both chambers in the coming months. FAMM supports both bills.”).
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2021, the U.S. House of Representatives passed it, paving the way for a
vote in the Senate.450 In March of 2021, Mr. Durbin and Senator Mike Lee
reintroduced the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013.451 This bipartisan
criminal justice legislation proposes modifying 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) to
reduce all ten-year mandatory minimums to five years and reduce all fiveyear mandatory minimums to two years.452 Following suit, many states,
including New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia, and California, recently
introduced bills to repeal mandatory minimums.453
Although the United States sees a trend towards ending mandatory
minimums,454 there are two reasons there has not been abolishment of all
such laws over the last 30 years. First, a sizable portion of the U.S. public
perceives politicians who propose to repeal mandatory minimum sentences
for drugs as “soft on crime.”455 This makes it difficult for this legislation to
gain wide support among elected officials. Second, the U.S. Senate has
moved to a system where a supermajority is required to pass legislation.456
According to Professor Ronald Wright, changes in mandatory minimum
sentencing laws will take place incrementally.457

450. See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Passes Bill to End Disparities in Crack Cocaine
Sentences, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2021, 5:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-housepasses-bill-end-disparities-crack-cocaine-sentences-2021-09-28/ [https://perma.cc/V2F2-FC
6K].
451. See TROY K. STABENOW, 5B WEST’S FED. FORMS, DISTRICT COURTS — CRIMINAL §
91:50.20 (5th ed., 2021); see also Durbin, Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act, COMM. ON
JUDICIARY (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/durbin-leeintroduce-smarter-sentencing-act [https://perma.cc/9BDX-TMCJ].
452. See S. 1410, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
453. See Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, ‘It Tears Families Apart’: Lawmakers Nationwide
Are Moving to End Mandatory Sentencing, APPEAL (Apr. 15, 2021), https://theappeal.org/ittears-families-apart-lawmakers-nationwide-are-moving-to-end-mandatory-sentencing/
[https://perma.cc/HLP7-J52C].
454. See Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to
Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 409 (2017) (“Although the federal government has
not moved as quickly as the states to repeal mandatory sentences, the trend in both the
federal and state systems is clearly toward repeal.”).
455. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1,
30 (2010) (“While the passage of mandatory minimums can enhance a representative’s
prospects for reelection, efforts to reform such laws may be perceived as a political liability,
allowing an opponent to assail the incumbent as being soft on crime.”).
456. See Ronald F. Wright, Portable Minimalism in Sentencing Politics, 2011 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 9, 13, 18 (“[T]he institutional decision rules in the federal legislative
process tell us that the vote count will have to approach unanimity before any change will
occur.”).
457. See id. at 18 (“One small reduction in sentences enacted every 24 years is a realistic
— and underwhelming — prediction of what we might expect from the federal system.”).

754

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

B. How to Battle the Plea Bargaining Machine
The primary mission of FPDOs is to provide zealous representation to
indigent federal criminal defendants.458 FPDOs cannot lobby.459 Thus,
these organizations only spend minimal resources on advocacy to eliminate
or amend sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimum sentencing laws.460
FPDOs’ efforts to educate lawmakers about legislation include its Federal
Public and Community Defenders Legislative Committee.461 This group
responds to questions from Congress related to legislation affecting federal
offenses.462 Some offices, at the invitation of the United States House
Judiciary Committee, also send AFPDs to work in criminal justice policy
and legislation for no more than two years.463
FPDOs spend the majority of their resources defending criminal
defendants. To deal with the practical impact of minimal trial rates,
FPDOs must provide effective training for line attorneys.464 Besides a
basic framework for defending federal criminal cases, the training must
hone AFPDs’ ability to screen cases that should go to trial and then
improve trial skills.
i. The Importance of Training
Through training, AFPDs can better detect when a case should go to
trial. Training can also improve trial practice. Besides in-house training, if

458. See Mission — Defender Services, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/defender-services/mission-defender-services [https://perma.cc/MW2F-Y2NK] (last
visited Feb. 17, 2022) (“The mission of the Defender Services program is to ensure that the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. §
3006A), and other congressional mandates is enforced on behalf of those who cannot afford
to retain counsel and other necessary defense services.”).
459. See Email from Jon M. Sands, Fed. Pub. Def., Dist. of Ariz., to author (Oct. 13,
2021) (on file with author).
460. As has been explained above, the purpose of FPDOs is to provide the highest quality
representation possible to its clients, not legislative efforts. On the other hand, FPDOs
offices have routinely sent AFPDs on details to work with senators such as Dick Durbin.
461. See Email from Jon M. Sands, supra note 420.
462. See id.
463. See FED. DEF. LEGIS. COMM, H. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 2020: FEDERAL DEFENDER
DETAILEE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/webform/vacancy
_files/2020_hjc_detailee_announcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CHD-6F7S] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2022).
464. See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 524 (2010) (summarizing an interview with Jon Sands,
Federal Public Defender for the District of Arizona, highlighting the importance of training
in the context of OSL and preventing low morale among AFPDs).
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available, FPDO supervisors should send newer AFPDs to trial colleges.465
They should also require inexperienced AFPDs to pair up with experienced
lawyers that have matters set for trial or evidentiary hearings so they can
cross-examine witnesses and observe how skilled lawyers try cases.
The size of an FPDO often dictates how much in-house training
supervisors can offer. Small offices have fewer lawyers and, therefore,
fewer resources for in-house opportunities. In these offices, new AFPDs
rely on trial colleges and national federal defender seminars.466 Trial
colleges include the National Criminal Defense College’s (NCDC) Trial
Practice Institute (TPI),467 the National Institute for Trial Advocacy
(NITA),468 Gerry Spence’s Trial Lawyer’s College in Laramie,
Wyoming,469 or Ira Mickenberg’s National Defender Training Project.470
Larger offices, such as the Federal Defenders of San Diego, have inhouse training programs, including a training director.471 In 2021, the
Tucson office of the Arizona FPDO started a training program for lawyers
new to federal trial practice.472 Three supervisors, including this Author,
teach weekly seminars on Mondays during lunch to lawyers on areas of
federal criminal defense. AFPDs in the Phoenix office of the FPDO can
participate during the sessions live via Zoom.
ii. Areas for Training to Improve Pre-Trial Representation
1. Advising Clients on the Benefits of a Plea Offer
FPDOs should train lawyers to advise clients to consider rejecting plea
agreements where the offer has either the same result as trial or marginal

465. A trial college is a training program where lawyers spend hours, sometimes days, in
breakout groups learning and practicing trial skills for jury selection, direct and cross
examination, and opening statements and closing arguments.
466. This proposition is not publicly available knowledge but is based on this Author’s
experience as AFPD, particularly the Author’s experience in training and as a supervisor.
467. Trial Practice Institute, NAT’L CRIM. DEF. COLL., https://ncdc.net/trial-practiceinstitute/ [https://perma.cc/P5PW-J763] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
468. NAT’L INST. TRIAL ADVOC, https://www.nita.org/s/ [https://perma.cc/C2YY-9CJ9]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
469. TRIAL LAWS. COLL., https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/ [https://perma.cc/7ZQCTJE6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
470. See Kathryn T. Ng, Tax Strategy Patents: Close Pandora’s Box on Patenting
Criminal Defense Strategies, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 253, 269 (2009) (explaining that Ira
Mickenberg is the director of the National Defender Training Project, organizes conferences
designed to inform practicing attorneys of new defense strategies and techniques).
471. See About FDSDI, FED. DEFS. SAN DIEGO INC., https://fdsdi.com/about-fdsdi/
[https://perma.cc/5K9U-QNA8] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
472. This information is not publicly available and is based on this Author’s professional
experience as a supervisory AFPD.
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benefit. This Author has seen plea agreements in which the only benefit is
the one level off for acceptance of responsibility that the government
controls under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).473 Clients must know the value of one
point off in terms of months of incarceration when considering a plea.
Clients must also know that in the vast majority of cases, judges do not
deduct two levels off for acceptance of responsibility after trial.474
Depending on the offense level, the difference between a two-point
reduction can be a few months to two years.475 For example, the difference
between levels 12 and 14 is four months, but the difference between levels
28 and 30 is 19 to 24 months.476
2. Advising Clients to Go to Trial
In Arizona, plea agreements on reactive drug cases include a four-level
reduction for fast-track.477 Therefore, it makes little sense to go to trial on
factually difficult drug importation cases. These drug cases also mostly
trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum.478 But plea offers in cases
involving the exportation of firearms or ammunition have no mandatory
minimums, and plea offers frequently do not include meaningful reductions
at sentencing.479 Going to trial on these cases rarely leads to substantially
worse results.

473. The one level reduction is only available for offenses with a base level of 16 or
higher. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
474. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195,
1231 (2015) (noting that only 3% of trial convictions result in acceptance of responsibility
reductions).
475. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
476. See id.
477. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Border: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 285 n.1
(1998) (“Reactive cases are those in which someone has been caught committing a crime
and the office reacts to an arrestee being presented for prosecution. Investigation therefore
follows, rather than precedes, arrest.”).
478. This is because drug arrests at or near the U.S.-Mexico border typically involve
large quantities of drugs. Most drugs consumed in the United States come from Mexico. See
More US Citizens Arrested for Smuggling Drugs over US-Mexico Border, NBC L.A. (May
31, 2021, 8:52 AM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california-news/more-uscitizens-arrested-for-smuggling-drugs-over-us-mexico-border/2607088/
[https://perma.cc/PUW6-9XR7].
479. There are exceptions. In one of my recent cases the difference between a sentence at
trial and a plea offer was five offense levels. The offense level after trial conviction was 26,
with two points off for fast-track under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 and three points off for acceptance
of responsibility under § 3E1.1. This means that if the client went to trial and lost, the
offense level, because he was criminal category I, would be 63 to 78 months. If convicted
with the plea agreement the guideline would be 37 to 46 months. At the low end, the
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Plea agreements in the Tucson sector of the District of Arizona are
mostly favorable. This has contributed to low trial rates in the District.480
Illegal re-entry clients see beneficial plea offers, as do those charged under
18 U.S.C. § 1324 for alien smuggling and 31 U.S.C. § 5332 bulk cash
smuggling prosecutions. Except for violent crimes or crimes against
children, Arizona plea agreements favor pre-trial resolution in lieu of
trial.481 But even in these cases, reasonable prosecutors offer pleas with
substantial savings compared to trial. Favorable plea policies are good for
clients because of reduced imprisonment. But these policies make it
difficult to proceed to trial.
3. The Ability to Screen Cases for Trial
AFPDs must be able to screen which cases should go to trial and then
effectively try cases that make it that far.482 FPDOs can provide training
for line AFPDs to properly screen when to recommend rejection of the plea
agreement and proceed to pre-trial motion practice. Successful motions
can lead to dismissal.483 Offices should also train lawyers to examine the
facts and theory of defense.484 They can pair experienced, successful
lawyers with younger lawyers, so they review cases together. Most
lawyers, including those less experienced, can spot issues such as Fourth
Amendment and Miranda violations but may not always identify nuanced
problems such as the need to file motions to suppress eyewitness
identifications, motions to sever charges or defendants, or motions to

difference is 26 months, at the high end 32 months. These amounts are significant, and the
vast majority of clients would accept the plea offer.
480. Typically drug and illegal-entry cases are difficult to defend, prompting defense
lawyers to strongly recommend plea agreements that are already favorable. See Kevin B.
Ross, Defense Techniques for Federal Drug Cases, in DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR DRUG
CRIMES ( 2010) (noting that “[f]ederal drug cases are not easy to defend”).
481. This proposition is based on this Author’s experience.
482. See Conrad & Clements, supra note 24, at 165 (“Prosecutors and defense attorneys
could boldly challenge the existing no-trial zeitgeist and hone their trial skills in cases that
make sense to try.”).
483. There are multiple grounds for filing a motion to dismiss a case. One example is a
motion to dismiss for outrageous government conduct. See, e.g., United States v. GarzaJuarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The government’s conduct may warrant a
dismissal of the indictment if that conduct is so excessive, flagrant, scandalous, intolerable
and offensive as to violate due process; the trial court may also dismiss the indictment in the
exercise of general supervisory powers.”).
484. See Laurie Shanks, Child Sexual Abuse: Moving Toward A Balanced and Rational
Approach to the Cases Everyone Abhors, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 517, 540 (2011) (“Once
the investigation is complete, the defense attorney must formulate a theory of defense.”); see
also Kinsey v. State, 798 P.2d 630, 632–33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (“[A] defendant is
entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense where there is evidence to support it, even
if such evidence is discredited”).

758

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

dismiss because of duplicitous or multiplicious indictments.485 Offices
should supply continuing legal education trainings to cover these areas.
To maximize the number of cases that should go to trial, FPDO
supervisors and heads of offices must train lawyers to take the time to
analyze all possible trial issues. To do this, supervisors must emphasize the
importance of requesting full disclosure and combing through it and the
defense investigation. As this takes time and AFPDs often have heavy
caseloads, it is difficult to try cases within two or three months from
arraignment.
4. Disclosing Trial Experience to Clients
Scholars have argued that lawyers should disclose their lack of trial
experience to prospective clients.486 This Author agrees with this
approach. Younger lawyers with little to no trial background should tell
clients that if their case proceeds to trial, he or she will try the case with
another lawyer in the office with adequate experience. Supervisors should
then pair new lawyers with more experienced ones if there is any indication
a case may proceed beyond plea resolution. One problem with current
federal practice is that it takes time for lawyers to acquire sufficient trial
exposure. Offices must decide if they want to hire only lawyers with
several years of experience or invest more resources into training newer
lawyers.
5. The Importance of Deep Work for Public Defenders 487
Although the practice of working deeply and instituting a sequential
method at work does not lead to more trials, it ensures that AFPDs have
more time to focus so they can produce higher quality, distraction-free
work with more satisfaction. Inevitably, working deeply will produce more
work. Because trials reduce the time that can be spent on other cases, these
strategies are crucial for FPDOs with high caseloads.
It is common knowledge among lawyers that high-quality work on cases
requires time and concentration. AFPDs need as much time as possible,
without interruption, to read disclosure, take notes, listen to and watch
recorded witness interviews, conduct legal research, assign investigators
and paralegals to conduct casework, and discuss the issues they find with

485. This is based on this Author’s experience as supervisory AFPD.
486. See McCormack & Bodnar, supra note 410, at 158, 200 (contending that a lawyer’s
failure to disclose his or her lack of trial experience to a prospective client may be a
misrepresentation).
487. See CAL NEWPORT, DEEP WORK: RULES FOR FOCUSED SUCCESS IN A DISTRACTED
WORLD (2016) for background on the concept of “deep work.”
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other lawyers, trial teams, and clients. FPDO staff should not criticize
lawyers who close their doors, do not respond quickly to emails, and turn
on do not disturb messages on telephones. These are ways to ensure the
peace and quiet required to engage in deep work.488 To ensure client
communication, this Author spends the majority of one day per week
visiting clients in person at detention facilities when not in trial, traveling
for work, or on vacation.489 But this Author also minimizes distractions
through quarterly and weekly planning, time-blocking every workday, and
practicing capture, configure, and control techniques.490
Lawyers must not ignore clients, but this does not mean lawyers should
be available to clients during all work hours.491 This Author’s preference
during a typical workday is to be available for phone calls from clients and
client family members and friends when not engaged in deep work blocks
— mostly at the end of a workday. On most days, I tell receptionists I may
receive phone calls for a designated one-hour period.
6. Speaking to the Media
The media can educate the public on problems in criminal justice, such
as mandatory minimum punishments.492 There are many examples of
shocking stories in the press. Take, for instance, the story of 47-year-old
Gregory Taylor, who the California Supreme Court released after spending
13 years in prison.493 A trial judge sentenced him to 25 years in prison for
488. See Craig Jarrow, Is an Open-Door Policy Killing Your Productivity?, TIME MGMT.
NINJA, http://timemanagementninja.com/2010/12/is-an-open-door-policy-killing-your-prod
uctivity [https://perma.cc/G3ZK-6GEN] (last visited Feb. 17, 2022).
489. Our office now has the ability for video visits with in-custody clients, but these are
less personal compared to in-person meetings.
490. See Cal Newport, Projects vs. Tasks: A Critical Distinction in Productive
Scheduling, STUDY HACKS BLOG (Jan. 2, 2021), https://www.calnewport.com/blog/2021/
01/02/projects-vs-tasks-a-critical-distinction-in-productive-scheduling/
[https://perma.cc/V8LB-C3PC] (supplying an example of quarterly, weekly, and daily
planning). For capture, configure, and control methods see generally D AVID ALLEN,
GETTING THINGS DONE (2001).
491. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(3) & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
“[A] lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter . . . .” See id. r. 1.4(a)(3). Comment 3 adds that “paragraph (a)(3) requires that the
lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant
developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.” See id. r. 1.4 cmt.
3.
492. See Alan S. Gerber, Dean Karlan & Daniel Bergan, Does the Media Matter? A Field
Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions,
1 AM. ECON. J. 35, 35 (2009) (asserting “[c]itizens learn about politics and government from
the [media]”).
493. See Naimah Jabali-Nash, Three Strikes and He’s Out (of Prison)! Homeless Man
Spent 13 Years Behind Bars After Trying to Break into Church Kitchen, CBS NEWS (Aug.
17, 2010, 4:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/three-strikes-and-hes-out-of-prison-
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trying to break into St. Joseph’s Church in Los Angeles to find food.494
The judge’s hands were tied due to California’s three-strikes mandatory
minimum law.495 Another example is the story of Mark Weller from Sioux
City, Iowa, a man who fell victim to federal mandatory drug sentencing
laws.496 Mr. Weller faced the ten-year mandatory minimum because
informants revealed he dealt two and a half kilograms of methamphetamine
across state lines to maintain an addiction.497 The Washington Post
published a story about Evans Ray, Jr., sentenced to life imprisonment for
violating federal three strikes for drug offenses.498 It was only because of
President Barack Obama’s pardon that Mr. Evans won his freedom after
spending 12 years in prison.499 These terrible stories can help foster
change by educating the public and creating momentum for reform.
FPDOs should not discourage line attorneys from speaking with trusted
journalists about cases in which mandatory minimums lead to unjust
results, so long as clients consent beforehand.500 Before speaking with
journalists about a client’s unjust length of imprisonment because of a
mandatory minimum law, line AFPDs should consult with supervisors and
heads of offices.
CONCLUSION
The plea bargaining machine has reduced options for the accused,
increased disparities for racial minorities in all parts of the trial process,
and crippled federal defender culture to one of armistice. Offense level
reductions from fast-track (U.S.S.G. §5K3.1) and government-controlled

homeless-man-spent-13-years-behind-bars-after-trying-to-break-into-church-kitchen/
[https://perma.cc/G7V7-U78W].
494. See id.
495. See California Man Released From Prison After Serving 13 Years, AFRO-AM. (Aug.
21, 2010), https://afro.com/california-man-released-from-prison-after-serving-13-years/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/B98K-U4P6].
496. See Eli Saslow, Against His Better Judgment, WASH. POST (June 6, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/06/06/against-his-better-judgment/
[https://perma.cc/VG5H-GUCK].
497. See id.
498. See Justin Wm. Moyer, A Drug Dealer Got a Life Sentence and Was Devastated. So
Was the Judge Who Sentenced Him., WASH. POST (May 6, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/a-drug-dealer-got-a-life-sentence-and-was-devastated-so-wasthe-judge-who-sentenced-him/2017/05/04/efb81020-2aa0-11e7-9b05-6c63a2
74fd4b_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZU9D-3XS4].
499. See id.
500. In speaking with the media, public defenders should adhere to ABA Standard 41.10, Relationship with the Media. This standard asks that lawyers secure client consent
before divulging confidential information and not allow the client’s representation to be
adversely affected by media contacts or attention. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,
DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 4-1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(b)), both often present in
pleas, help create heavy trial penalties. Mandatory minimums in drug cases
make it almost impossible to advise any client to go to trial.
Today, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges realize the power of the
machine and avoid trials over pleas in more than 97% of cases. This
starkly contrasts with practice in the 1970s and 1980s before the guidelines,
when lawyers tried cases monthly. It also contrasts with Pima County
Superior Court’s 8% trial rate in the mid-2000s, where this Author started
as a public defender. Today, the tiny fraction of cases that proceed to trial
does not faze most criminal justice professionals.
Scholarship has adequately addressed the effect of the guidelines and
mandatory minimums on trial rates. But it has not supplied an analysis on
how the plea bargaining machine operates in real cases along the United
States-Mexico border. Notable offense level reductions in plea offers and a
culture of plea-pushing among defenders make it rare for those charged
with illegal re-entry to exercise trial rights.
The future is uncertain. Will trial rates deplete to less than 1%
nationally? Will Congress eventually do away with mandatory minimums,
mitigating the plea bargaining machine in drug prosecutions? FPDOs and
AFPDs have no control over these matters. But they have the power to
better analyze cases and sometimes push for trial, not pleas. This practice,
along with improved courtroom lawyering, can make a small but
significant dent in the criminal justice system by increasing the trial rate.

